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Introduction
During the early 1930's, western Europe lay under the shadows of 
economic dislocation, and the rise of German nationalism- These two issues 
brought new problems of security to Europe. The resultant insecurity 
manifested itself in an increase of armaments and attempts to compromise 
democratic faiths and ideas by appealing for stronger central governments. 
Economic disruption had the effect of forcing governments to enter into 
the economic life of their peoples by increasing the powers of the state. 
The rise of German nationalism with its avowed aim.of destroying the 
Versailles settlement added to this general feeling of insecurity. The 
faith in democratic ideas and practices was weakened by the inability of 
the western democracies to deal with these problems.
Political factions of both the extreme right and left gained strength 
from the economic and political weaknesses of the democracies. In France 
these weaknesses contributed to the growth of such extreme right wing 
organizations as the Croix de Feu and the Action Français. The leftist 
forces combined against this common danger by creating the Popular Front^ 
a coalition of Socialists, Radical Socialists and Communists headed by the 
Socialist Leon Blum.̂  The Popular Front won the election of April 1936, 
and its leader, Blum, became premier. But the financial difficulties and 
the internal divisions of the French people continued to worsen and, as a 
consequence, weakened French foreign policy.
^Leon Blum. (1872-I950). First Socialist premier of France. 
Premier, June 1936 to June 1937*
2
In March 1936, Hitler's reoecupatlon of the Rhineland greatly inten­
sified the French feeling of insecurity. To deal with this new German 
threat the French attempted to strengthen their security system by wooing 
Mussolini into an anti-German front and by negotiating an alliance with 
the Soviet Union. Both attempts ultimately ended in failure. In the
final analysis French security depended upon the policy of Great Britain.
2The British prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, maintained the tradi­
tional British foreign policy of avoiding European entanglements. He was 
against any type of collective security such as the League of Nations and 
binding military agreements. Because of its grave financial, military and 
political problems, Britain was inclined, to pursue a cautious policy of 
indecision, ineptitude and watchful waiting. The British government pre­
ferred to maintain the post-war status-quo established by the Versailles 
settlement and the Locarno agreements. Any British efforts to pursue a 
conciliatory attitude towards Italy in support of the French policy would 
only be in reaction to a continuance of German military adventurism.
Although Germany was in danger of becoming isolated in the thirties, 
Italian agression in Ethiopia and the implementation of sanctions against 
Italy by the League soon changed the situation to Germany's favor. The 
possibility of Italy associating itself with France and Britain was out 
of the question because of the application of the economic sanctions.
By its own actions in Ethiopia and later in Spain, Italy estranged itself 
from Britain and France and moved steadily towards Germany.
^Stanley Baldwin. (1867-1950). British statesman. Prime minister,
1923-1924; 1924-1929; 1935-1937.
3
The aim of German foreign policy since 1933 had been the destruction 
of the Versailles settlement. In addition. Hitler was constantly preaching 
to Europe the danger of Communism. Hitler’s anti-Communist policy was a 
convenient smoke-screen behind which Hitler could operate with a more 
realistic and pragmatic attitude concerning Germany's interests, while 
at the same time allaying many of the apprehensions of conservative 
circles in France and Britain over German aggressiveness. The turning 
point in German foreign policy came in 1936 when once having put aside 
the Versailles question, Germany turned her attention upon the goals 
Hitler had decided upon as early as 1923 while writing Mein Kampf.
Forced to emerge from Its diplomatic isolation by the menace of 
Nazi Germany, Russia proceeded to follow a tactical policy of cooperation 
with the western democracies. This policy revealed itself in 193^ and 
1935 when Russia joined the League of Nations and concluded mutual 
assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia. In 193^, the Comintern 
instructed all foreign Communist parties to cooperate with political groups 
opposed to Fascism. This was particularly evident in the formation of 
the French Popular Front.
While the major European powers concerned themselves with economic 
problems and international affairs, Spain in the thirties suffered from 
political, economic and social hardships resulting from.attempts by 
Spanish liberals to implement democracy in Spain. King Alfonso XIII^ 
was forced to flee Spain in April 1931. because of anti-monarchial election 
returns. The Spanish Liberals established a republic in place of the
3_.'King Alfonso XIII. (1866-19^1)• Bourbon king of Spain, 1902-1931
k 
kmonarchy. New elections for the Spanish parliament or Cortes resulted in 
a left-republican victory.
The leftist majority in the Cortes immediately set out to enact 
a radical legislative program which resulted in alienating the strongest, 
wealthiest and most influential elements of the Spanish society. This 
was done with much rapidity but little foresight. In the space of two 
years, the Cortes estranged itself from the large landowners by instigating 
a thorough land reform, from the Church by placing education in secular 
hands and from the army by attempting to reform the obsolete officer 
Corp. The reforms were needed and demanded by the working classes, but 
the celerity and method of carrying them out alarmed the vested interests 
against which they were directed.
In 1933> the reaction to these reforms produced a swing to the right. 
A conservative coalition was formed under the leadership of Gil Robles^ 
and Alejandro Lerroux.^ As might be expected, the conservative government 
set out to annul or repress the reforms of the leftist parties. The land, 
educational and army reforms were either, repealed or allowed to fall by 
the wayside for lack of administrative funds.
4In 1930, Alfonso XIII appointed General Berenguer as prime minister 
to replace General Primo de Rivera who had been forced to resign. This 
change of ministers did not help to solve the acute economic problems of 
Spain. The depression became worse and strikes increased in violence. 
Martial law was proclaimed. Popular pressure forced Alfonso to announce 
the restoration of the constitution that had been suspended since 1923 . 
and to set a date for elections to the Cortes. The April 12, 1931 elections 
resulted in a republican victory. Alfonso fled the country without 
abdicating.
^Gil Robles. (1898-). Leader of the Spanish Catholic Party, CEDA.
^Alejandro Lerroux. (l86l-19^9) Leader of the Spanish Radical 
Party. Foreign Minister of the Republic, 1931-
5
Political parties of loth the right and the left began to prepare 
for the February 1936 elections. The leftist parties, including the 
Communists, allied with the moderate republicans to form a coalition com­
monly referred to as the Popular Front.^ The rightist parties, although 
not as well organized as those of the left, still maintained a common 
front against the leftist reforms. The conservative parties had two 
things in common, fear of the working classes and the protection of their 
vested interests. But within this common front there were many divergent 
groups with different goals and aims. The Traditionalists and the 
Monarchists favored a return of the monarchy, preferably from the Bourbon 
line. The Catholic action groups were willing to cooperate with parlia­
mentary government but demanded that the interests of the church be 
protected. The Falangist party, led by José Primo de Rivera,^ was a 
Fascist group along the lines of Italian Fascism. The Carlists advocated 
strong nationalism and a corporate socialism.
On the eve of the February elections, another Spanish organization 
was watching the developments with apprehension. This was the curious and 
unique institution of the Spanish army. In recent times the army had been 
the final arbiter of Spanish political disputes. The situation prevailing 
in Spain in 1936 was no exception. The army was more of an instrument of 
internal policy than a defender of national security. The army reforms 
enacted by the leftist government had been particularly irritating to this
7The Anarchists, who controlled the third largest trade union in 
Spain, refused to join.
8 ,
José Primo de Rivera. (1903-1936). Founder and leader of the 
Spanish Iklange or Fascist party. Executed by the Republicans.
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glorified officers' club whose ratio of one officer to every six men was
9three times greater than the French army ratio. Every year, thirty
percent of the entire national budget was devoted to this inefficient
10 ^ 11 organization. By 1936, the army leaders. General Francisco Franco
included, had decided to intervene in the political affairs of Spain if 
the election returned the leftist parties to power.
'The February elections resulted in a victory for the Popular Front. 
Immediately the Spanish working classes demanded that the reforms legis­
lated during the period from 1931 to 1933 be put into operation. Strikes 
and riots broke out when the government could not implement the reforms 
as quickly as the working classes expected. This violence was recipro­
cated by the Fascist and right-wing groups whose aim was to disgrace and 
weaken the Madrid government by creating a state of anarchy. Through 
the Fascist and Catholic newspapers, world opinion became convinced that 
Spain was, in fact, suffering from uncontrollable social disorder.
The defeat of the rightist parties in the municipal elections con­
vinced the leaders of the Army, the Church and the landed interests that
democratic measures were insufficient to combat the growing progressive
12
elements. On July, the assassination of Calvo Sotelo, a rightist 
political leader, set off another series of social disorders that cul­
minated in the July l8 rebellion of the Spanish Foreign Legion stationed
A.M. van der Esch. Prelude tc War, (New York, I96I), 3-4. Here­
after cited as Esch.
^Qjbid., 4.
^^Francisco Franco y Bahamonde. (1892-). Chief of Staff of the Army,
1 9 3 4. Military Commander of the Canary Islands, 1936. Leader of the Rebel 
or Nationalist forces, 1936-1939- Spanish Chief of State, 1939 to present.
12Calve Sotelo. (1893-1936)- Leader of the Monarchist party.
Murdered by Leftists on July I3 .
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in Spanish Morocco « General Franco flew from the Canary Island, where 
he had been assigned by the Republican government because of his political 
beliefs, to Morocco to take charge of the rebellion. At approximately 
the same time, military garrisons throughout Spain rose in rebellion 
against the government authorities. The uprising succeeded in the major 
Spanish cities of Cadiz, Jerez, Aleçiras and Seville, but failed in Madrid 
and Barc e l o n a . T h e  failure of the coup d'etat in Madrid and Barcelona 
was because of the energetic resistance of the working classes.
By July 22, the coup d* état had turned into a civil war. The Rebels 
were in control of the army, the major part of the airforce and a small 
portion of the navy. The Madrid government commanded the loyalty of the 
navy, the police force and the working classes.
With the government controlling the navy, it was dangerous if not 
impossible to ferry the Rebel forces from Morocco to Spain in order to 
support the rebellious garrisons. Without the support of the Spanish 
legionaires, the uprising in Spain could not succeed. It looked as if 
the army had failed in its attempts to control the political destiny of 
Spain.
Since Hitler's rise to power, German propaganda activities had become 
increasingly evident in Spain. This was especially true among the large 
German colony in Madrid and Barcelona. Spanish rightist newspapers 
became convenient mediums for the dissemination of the Nazi propaganda 
material. The German embassy and legations in Spain also distributed 
money and propaganda material to the Spanish Fascists. It was rumored
^^Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, (New York, I96I), 204. Here­
after cited as Thomas.
that the Spanish Falange received some three million pesetas yearly from
Ikthese German sources. An important bridge of communication between the 
Spanish Falangists and the Nazi officials was the Ibero-American Institute
15in Berlin, under the leadership of General Wilhelm Faupel.
During the conservative administration in Spain from 1933 to 1936,
right-wing Spaniards made several contacts with German officials. In
February 1936, General Sanjurjc and José Primo de Rivera visited Germany
on a winter-sports holiday at Partenkirchen. While in Germany, Sanjurjo
was taken on a tour of the Germans arms factories by Admiral Canaris, head
17of German Military Intelligence.
In the summer of 1936 German activities in Spain increased. The
German State Railroads opened a tourist office in Madrid. The official
German news service, Deutsche Nachrichter Bureau, also expanded operations
in Spain by establishing an office in Madrid staffed by two German foreign 
18
correspondents.
In July 1936, Germany reacted to the events in Spain by publicly
stating that the struggle was a battlefield upon which western European
it
Dante A. Puzzo, Spain and the Great Powers, 1936-19^1, (New York, 
1 9 6 2), k6-kj. Hereafter cited as Puzzo.
^^General Wilhelm Faupel. (1873-19^5)» Head of the Ibero-American 
Institute in Berlin. German Charge d' Affaires to Nationalist Spain, 1936. 
Ambassador to Spain, 1936-1937- Recalled from Spain in September of 1937.
^^General José Sanjurjc. (1872-I9 3 6). Leader of the unsuccessful 
1932 revolt against the Republic. Titular head of the 1936 revolt.
17Although there is no doubt that these visits did take place, there 
is no documentary evidence that German officials promised aid to the 
Spanish in the event of a military uprising in Spain.
^®Henry Buckley, Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London, 19tO ), 
203-204. Hereafter cited as Buckley.
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civilization combated Bolshevism. Hitler welcomed the Spanish revolt as 
an opportunity to further his own plans in Europe. If he could create 
0 nough diplomatic tension over the Spanish situation by backing Italian 
intervention and by aiding the Spanish Rebels with a minimum of help, he 
could then perhaps draw diplomatic attention away from his manoeuvers in 
central Europe. An added advantage would be that Italy, by its inter­
vention, would become embroiled with Britain and France and as a conseq-
19uence move closer towards Germany.
Hitler also entertained definite ideas of the acquisition of material 
benefits from Spain. He was especially interested in the Spanish mineral 
resources of wolfram and copper ores that were vital to the German arma­
ment industry and the Four Year Plan. In the case of any future con­
frontation with Britain and France, Hitler wanted Spain politically akin 
and economically dependent upon Germany. This would enable Germany to 
menace the communications and commercial routes of Britain and France.
When the Spanish Civil War broke out in July 1936, the diplomatic 
stage of Europe was occupied with the British and French attempts to 
reconstruct the Locarno agreements which had been destroyed by the German 
reoccupation of the Rhineland. In July, the League, with British and 
French support, realized the ineffectiveness of the sanctions against 
Italy and withdrew them. Thus the last major obstacle in the way of 
improving British-French Italian relations was elminated. The withdrawal 
of the economic sanctions was an attempt by the British and French to
^^Ivone Kirkpatrick, Mussolini, A Study in Power, (New York, 1^64), 
34o . Hereafter cited as Kirkpatrick.
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acquire Italian goodwill and assistance in restoring the Locarno pacts. 
But the Spanish Civil War with French, British, Russian, German and 
Italian intervention handicapped any efforts to ease European tensions 
after the Abyssinian affair.
The Spanish Civil War was not an isolated event. It was not merely 
a domestic problem but influenced European politics and international 
relations tc a large extent. The ideological, political and economic 
competition among the European powers in Spain contributed significantly 
to the solidification of the major European states into power blocs which 
were to struggle for the mastery of Europe during World War II.
CHAPTER I
GERMAN MILITAEY AND TECHNICAL AID 
TO THE SPANISH NATIONALISTS
1936-1939
"The situation prevailing in Spain in 1936 was conducive to foreign 
intervention.'’̂  Both Spanish political groups, right and left, espoused 
political ideologies taken from the traditional and current practices of 
western Europe. Thus the various political groupings in Spain reflected, 
respectively, the political philosophies and practices of dictatorship, 
as exemplified by Nazi Germany, and democracy, as exemplified by the 
French Popular Front. It was therefore natural that the major powers of 
Europe became involved with the developments in Spain by aiding, materi­
ally and diplomatically, their ideological comrades in arms. Other 
reasons motivated foreign intervention, but those expressing political 
or idealoglcal considerations involved prestige, which at the diplomatic 
conjuncture of 1936 was an important element of the European situation.
In Spain "neither side in this unfolding conflict felt equipped to
2
fight it successfully." The Rebel forces could count on approximately 
94,000 troops under the separate commands of General Emilo Mola, com­
mander of the Northern Army, General Franco, commander of the Army of
^Norman J . Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the 
Spanish Civil Strife, (New York, 1939), 119- Hereafter cited as Padelford■
^Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, (New York, I96I), 205-206. 
Hereafter cited as Thomas.
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Africa and General Queipo de Llano^ commander of the military garrison 
in Sevelle. Ecwever, the Legionaires and Moroccan troops stationed in 
Spanish Morocco comprised the only efficient and well equipped force 
under Rebel control. But the troops in Morocco, under the command of 
General Franco, had no communications with the Peninsula and no means to 
cross the Straits of Gibraltar in order to link up with the other Rebel 
forces in an attempt to capture Madrid. Conscious of the deficiencies 
of his forces. Franco, as early as July 19, decided to seek foreign 
assistance. In the meantime, the Loyalist government suffered from an 
acute shortage of arms and trained combat troops. With its control of 
the bank of Spain which contained the sixth largest gold reserve in the
4world, the Republic also decided to seek arms abroad.
The Rebel’s attempts to acquire foreign assistance for their efforts 
to defeat the Loyalist government can be divided into three separate and 
unconnected appeals. General Franco appealed to the German government 
for aid through the German embassy in Paris and sent personal representa­
tives to Hitler. General Mola, commander of the Rebel forces in the 
Northern provinces of Spain, sent personal representatives to Berlin and 
Rome distinct from those sent by Franco. In fact, the German authorities' 
in Berlin were astonished that the Spanish emissaries had no knowledge of 
each other's mission. In addition, General Queipo de Llano requested 
German aid through the German consul in Seville. All three of these
3The Spanish Republican government is hereafter referred to as the 
Loyalists. The opposing forces are hereafter referred to as the Rebels 
cr the Nationalists.
4
Thomas, 205-206.
13
requests were Independent of each other and indicated that there was no
communication nor coordination of effort between the three Rebel generals.
Franco's first appeal for German aid was in the form of a dispatch
on July 22 from the German consul at Tetuan to General Kuhlental, Military
Attache of the German embassy in Paris.
"General Franco and Lieutenant Colonel Beigbeder^ send greeting to 
their friend, the honorable General Kuhlental, inform him of the new 
Nationalist Spanish Government, and request that he send ten troop- 
transport planes with maximum seating capacity through private 
German firms. Transfer by air with German crews to any airfield in 
Spanish Morocco. "6
At approximately the same time, Rebel, airforce officer Captain 
Francisco Arranz, with Adolf Langenheim, head of the Nazi party in Tetuan, 
and Johannes Bernhardt, a German businessman and director of the economic 
branch of the Auslandsorganisation^ in Tetuan, took off in a captured 
German Lufthansa plane D-APOK-destination Berlin.^ They carried with 
them a private letter from Franco to Hitler supporting Colonel Beigbeder's 
request for German aid. Landing at Berlin's Tempelhof airport on July 25 
with instruction to negotiate with the German authorities for the purchase 
of planes and war materials, the trio proceeded directly to the head­
quarters of the Auslandsorganisation.
Colonel Juan Beigbeder Atienza. (1890-1957)■ Veteran of the Mor­
occan wars and Spanish military attache at the Spanish embassy in Berlin 
in 1936°
^united States, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Vol. 
Ill, Series D, (Washington, 194"^,” 3-4. ' Hereafter cited as GFD.
7The Auslandsorganisation was the foreign organization of the Nazi 
party. It contacted and organized German nationals in foreign countries.
8
GFD., 7-8 .
lu
That evening Hitler, returning from the theater, was notified of the
develcpments in Spain and of the Spanish rebels' request for aid. He
9 10then sent for Goering, Blomberg, and Admiral Canaris, head of German 
Military Intelligence. At this meeting Hitler decided to give active 
support to Franco. In his testimony at Wuremburg, Goering stated that 
he had urged Hitler to give support to the Spanish rebels in order to 
step the spread of communism and to enable him, Goering, to test the 
combat and technical efficiency of the Luftwaffe. Admiral Canaris also 
supported the idea of German aid to Spain. Hitler agreed and appointed
11
Canaris as the go-between for the coordination of the German aid program.
In the meantime, the German Foreign Ministry, knowing of the Spanish
request and of the arrival in Berlin of the two emissaries from Franco,
advised the Auslandsorganisation "against bringing the two officers into
contact with official Party authorities and against promoting their plans
12here in any way. . . " Dieckhoff, Director of the Political Department
of the Foreign Ministry, and his superior, Baron von Weurath^^ refused to 
agree tc the deliveries of German war material to the Spanish rebels be­
cause cf the impossibility of keeping the deliveries a secret and of the
9Hermann Goering. (1893-19^6). Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, 
1934-1939- Head of the German Four Year Plan, 1936.
^^Field Marshall Werner von Blomberg. (i8T9“1946). Commander-in- 
Chief of the Wehrmacht, 1935-1938.
11United States, Trial cf the Maj or War Criminals before the Inter­
national Military Tribunal, Vol. II. (Efuremburg, 19^7), 280-8l. Here­
after cited as TMWC.
^^GFD., 10-11.
""^Constantin von Neurath. f1873-1956 ). German Foreign Minister,
1932-38.
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acnsequences that might develop for the Germans residing in Loyalist 
Spain. On July 2h, Neurath told the War Ministry that ''in the view of
the Foreign Ministry compliance with the Spanish request is out of the
,l4
question at this time." Neurath’s negative attitude was without the 
knowledge that Hitler was in the process of deciding to aid the Spanish 
Nationalists. In fact, the Foreign Ministry was kept in the dark con­
cerning Hitler’s July 25th decision. Ihis is shown by the fact that as 
late as July 28, the Foreign Ministry still opposed German aid to Spain.
Although the Foreign Ministry was against aid to the Rebels, the 
Nazi party maintained the opposite viewpoint. The part played by Lang­
enheim and Bernhardt, both members cf the Nazi party, indicated that 
the policy followed was that of the NSDAP and not that of the Foreign 
Ministry.
At the July 25th meeting between Hitler, Blomberg, Goering and 
Canaris, and in subsequent meetings, a department was created in the War 
Ministry to supervise the recruitment of volunteers and the dispatch of 
war materials to the Spanish rebels. This department was termed the 
COS 'W'. Two holding companies, Hisma and Rowak, were set up to control 
all trade between Germany and Spain. If a German trader wished to sell 
anything to Spain, he would have to sell it first to Rowak, the German 
half of the company, who would then deliver it to Spain where it would 
be marketed by Hisma.
A fleet of merchant ships assembled at Hamburg and departed for
^^GFD., 7 . 
^^Thomas, 230-231.
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Spain under the escort of the German navy. Thirty Junkers, 52 transport 
aircraft were sent immediately to Morocco. A "tourist group" under the 
direction of General von Scheele was set up in order to send volunteers 
to man the aircraft and to form a training contingent for the Spanish 
army. On July 31; eighty-five men left Hamburg for Cadiz with six Heinkel 
fighter planes and arrived on August 5- These first contingents of aid 
to France were soon followed by engineers, technicians and more fighter 
planes. In September, more fighter planes were dispatched along with 
two tank companies, a battery of anti-aircraft guns and some reconnaissance 
aircraft. The tank companies were under the command of Colonel von Thoma, 
while General von Scheele was the military head of the German holding 
company in Spain, Hisma. The mission of von Thoma and his officers was 
partly to train troops and partly to gain battle e xperienceGeneral 
Goering was appointed by Hitler as administrator of the Four Year Plan, 
and in this position had charge of the German arms deliveries and the 
release of foreign currency for the cost of the German supplies to Spain. 
This elaborate aid organization was created within a week of the arrival 
of Franco's representatives in Berlin.
Both War Minister Blomberg and General Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief 
cf the Army, shared the Foreign Ministry's negative attitude towards 
sending aid tc Spain. The German army was inclined to follow a cautious 
policy towards Spain and strongly opposed committing any substantial 
number of German troops. It was because of this pressure by the High 
Command that German aid to Spain did not include a large: number of ground
227-231.
IT
fcrces. vhus the German participation in the Spanish war was limited
primarily to the Luftwaffe, whose activities caused additional friction
IT
between Hitler and the High Command of the army.
On August 2 5  ̂ Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg appointed Lieutenant
General Karl Warlimont as German military advisor to General Franco.
Blomberg told Warlimont that Hitler had decided to send limited aid to
Spain. Although German air support would be extensive, "any ground support
would consist only of armaments and sufficient personnel to train Spanish
-I8troops in its use.'
On August 26, Warlimont proceeded to Rome accompanied by Admiral
Canaris. While in Rome they conferred with Mussolini and General Mario
Eoatta, Canaris' Italian counterpart. Here it was agreed that Italy
would also furnish Franco with aid. By early September Warlimont had
made contact with Franco at his headquarters in Caceres.^^
German military opinion was still cautious by mid-August. Admiral
Raeder had asked Hitler for a decision on German policy towards Spain,
while adding that in his opinion Germany could not assume the risks of
intervention. Raeder was especially worried, since almost the entire
20German fleet was ordered to Spanish waters'.
In the meantime. Franco had no difficulty in crossing the straits
ITTelford Taylor, Sword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the
Third Reich, (New York, 1952), 13^. Hereafter cited as 8 and S.
^^United Nations Security Council, Report of the Sub-Committee on 
the Spanish Question, (New York, 1946), T- Hereafter cited as United 
Nations.
19 Ibid., T.
ZOoFD., 50-52.
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with ths aid of the German and Italian transport planes. The German navy 
also assisted by running interference for the Rebel troop transports 
against the Loyalist naval vessels. In one month, l4,000 Spanish and 
Moroccan troops had been ferried across the straits by German and Italian 
aircraft. The German technical advisor in charge of the airlift was 
Captain Heinchen. The Italians supplied fighter cover for the merchant 
ships which had by August 5 ferried some 2,500 men with equipment from 
Morocco tc Spain. ’’Hence forward Franco was in command of the Straits.
An army would therefore be assembled at Seville, to march due north to 
cut off the whole Portuguese frontier from the Republicans, to join
.21forces with Mola and to advance upon Madrid along the Tagus valley.
With the steady flow of German and Italian war materials to the Rebel
forces, the military situation in Spain took on a new character. Mola
and Franco, in the north and South respectively, led the two major
campaigns. General Franco with his Army of Africa advanced northward
from Seville, while General Mola with the Army of the North advanced
against the Basque province cf Guipuzcoa. The rapid advance of the two
forces was made possible by German and Italian aid.
At this time, the main route for German supplies to Spain was
through Portugal. To coordinate the purchase of these war materials.
General Franco's brother Nicolas Franco was sent to Lisbon under the
cover name cf Aurelio Fernando. His job was to supervise the procurement
22
cf war materials from Germany. After being unloaded in Portuguese Ports,
21Thomas, 235-
22
GF3., 2 6 .
19
the material was then shipped by rail through customs without inspection, 
and on to the Rebels. On August 22, the German Chargé d'Affaires in 
Lisbon notified Berlin that Hisma cooperated with the Rebel officials
23in shipping German war material across Portuguese territory. Antonio 
Salazar, dictator of Portugal, believed that a Loyalist victory in Spain 
would mean eventual communist take-over in Portugal. He was therefore 
ready to give full support to the forces of General Franco.
The Loyalist government in Madrid was by no means idle concerning 
foreign assistance. During the first two weeks of August, its repre­
sentatives in Paris were asking for planes and munitions from the French 
government. In order to eliminate the dilemma that the Spanish request 
caused for French public opinion and the foreign policy of the Quai 
d’Orsay, the French government on August 1, directed an appeal to the 
principal European governments to adopt an attitude of non-intervention 
towards the Spanish conflict. In the meantime, while French supplies 
continued to reach the Loyalists, the French government announced that 
if it was supplying arms to Spain, others were doing the same thing.
But because of the division cf public opinion over aiding the Loyalists, 
French aid could not continue indefinitely without the fall of the Blum 
government.
While Franco advanced northward in an attempt to capture Badajoz, 
Mola'8 fcrces engaged in an offensive against the Basque cities of 
San Sebastian and Irun. Because cf the initial Rebel failure to control 
the northern provinces of Spain at the outset of the revolt, Mola's plan
23GFD., 53
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fer a quick thrust southward over the Guadarrama mountains to take Madrid
had tc be discarded for fear of an attack from the rear. Thus he was
forced to reverse direction and concentrate his efforts upon sealing off
2I4.the French border In order to cut off French aid to the Basques. Mola 
needed planes, bombs and rifle and machine gun ammunition in order to carry 
cut the offensive. He therefore requested through the German embassy In 
Paris on August 8, I5, and 16, that these materials be sent to him 
immediately. The point cf delivery was to be La Coruna. In his request 
Mela also complained that thus far the southern group had been supplied
25exclusively.
On August ih, Franco succeeded In capturing Badajoz. This frontier 
town was strategically vital for the Rebels because It enabled Franco to 
open up a line of communication with Lisbon, the port of entry for most 
cf the German war material. Communications between Franco and Mola 
were also Improved. Aiding Franco In his northward offensive was the 
arrival in Seville on August 9 of ten new Italian Savola tri-motor bombers 
accompanied by twenty Italian pilots, eighteen German Junker tri-motor 
bombers with thirty German pilots, six German pursuit planes and six 
German anti-aircraft guns of the latest m o d e l . O n  August 25, the Rebel 
forces arrived within effective bombing distance of Madrid. On August 
27 and 28, German Junkers 52 bombed Madrid. The bombing evidently had its 
effect for on August 28, General Faupel, German Charge d'Affairs in Spain,
JiThe French border was opened on August 8, but was soon closed
because cf British pressure. However France continued to ship material
tc Spain.
2 SGF3., 40.
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notified Berlin that this action threatened to endanger the safety of
the official German representatives residing in Madrid and the German
27colony in the city.
On August 2k, Germany adhered to the French embargo proposal on war
materials to Spain. If Germany continued its shipments of material to
the Spanish Rebels, it would now have to be done with the utmost secrecy.
This Germany began to do on August 27, by notifying all German embassies
and legations dealing with the Spanish Rebels that henceforth all reports
concerning German aid to the Rebels or the requests for such aid should
28
be sent by way of courier or cipher.
The Spanish Rebels were also assisted by the activities of the German 
navy. An example of German naval aid to the Rebels occurred on August 17 
outside of the harbor of Ceuta on the southern coast of Spain. The 
Loyalist warship Jaime I was preparing to resume its bombardment of 
Rebel ports when the German 'pocket' battleship Deutschland manouevered 
itself between the habor facilities and the Loyalist ship, thus making 
it impossible tc bombard the harbor. The Deutschland became involved in 
another incident when on August 3 it visited the rebel controlled port 
L'f Ceuta accompanied by the torpedo boat Luche. Admiral Carls, Commander 
cf the German High Seas Fleet, and Secretary of Legation Fischer of the 
German embassy in Madrid, disembarked in order to greet General Franco 
and to compliment him on his efforts against the Loyalist government.
By the end of August, reports indicated that there were at least eight
27Germany did not extend do jure recognition to Franco until November 
1936, and therefore still maintained diplomatic representatives in Madrid.
28GFD., 59.
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German •warships in Spanish waters. For a navy the size of Germany's, 
this was a major deployment of its fcrces.
Throughout August, Franco's position as leader of the Rebels steadily 
improved. This was because of his military successes and the contacts 
he had established with Germany and Italy. Both countries held the 
opinion that Franco was an able military leader and could be influenced
29by them. At a meeting of the Rebel Military Junta on September 12, 
Franco was named head of the Rebel military command. This was not with­
out grumbling by General Cabanellas who held more seniority than did 
Franco. A month later Franco was named Head of State, thus completing 
his rise to power in Nationalist Spain. On October 2, an administrative 
Junta was created to carry out the Rebel administrative functions.
These actions solidified the Rebel government and made it more capable 
of facing the non-military problems which confronted the Military Junta.
On October 6, Hitler sent verbal congratulations to Franco on his becoming 
Head of State. Franco replied by thanking Hitler for his invaluable 
aid.
During the month of September and the first half of October, Rebel 
attempts to encircle Madrid proceeded slowly and systematically from four 
directions: from the northeast towards Guadalajara, from the north from
Semesierra, from the west from San Martin de Valdeiglesias, and from 
the southwest from T o l e d o . D u r i n g  these battles around Madrid, the 
Loyalist forces continued to receive war materials from Russia which
Thomas, 2jk,
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31previously declared in the London Non-Intervention Coimnittee that it
would not be bound to observe non-intervention to any greater extent
than the other members of the Committee. From October 20 to the 28th,
at least nine Russian cargo ships reached Loyalist ports. Their cargos
included 100 trucks, 25 tanks, 30 pieces of artillery, 1 ,500 tons of
ammunition and 6,000 tons of diesel oil.^^ With the arrival of the
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Russian material and the International Brigades, the Madrid defenders 
were able to resist the Rebel attacks. Germany now faced the decision 
whether to increase its aid to Franco in order for him to take Madrid, 
or to withdraw altogether.
On October 30, Weurath instructed Admiral Canaris to inform General 
Franco that Germany held a poor opinion of the combat tactics of the 
Rebel forces. Canaris was also instructed to report to Franco that Germany 
would send more assistance, but with the stipulation that if Franco 
accepted this aid, the German reinforcements would be under German command. 
Franco agreed, and on November 6 the Condor Legion with Geheral von 
S p e r r l e 3 ^  as commander and Colonel Richthofen^^ as chief of staff, dis­
embarked at Seville. The Condor Legion included a battle group of four 
bomber squadrons of twelve Junker 52 bombers each, a fighter group of 
Heinkels 51 and Messerschmidts 109 of the same strength, and a seaplane.
3^Thomas, 309<
^^The International Brigades included personal volunteers from Western 
Europe, Russia and the United States, plus many other countries. Their 
political beliefs were to the left if not actually Communist oriented.
They had come to Spain to fight for their fellow workers and political 
freedom.
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Hugo Sperrle. Commander of Condor Legion Nov. 1936 to Oct. 1937-
^^Baron von Richthofen. (l895-)- Chief of Staff of Condor Legion,
1937-1 9 3 8. Commander, Nov. 1938 to May 1939-
2h
reconnaisance and experimental squadron. This force was supported by 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft units plus two armored units of sixteen 
tanks each. The total number of personnel amounted to 6,500 men. Al­
though the Condor Legion proved to be an effective fighting force 
throughout the civil war, it operated under very primitive conditions.
It flew mainly without radio and its machine-gun had to be reloaded by 
hand. An additional force of gunnezy, mine and signal specialists was 
later assigned to the Legion. These latter units operated from the 
battleships Deutschland and Admiral Scheer. Additional reinforcements 
continued to arrive throughout the year. On November 17, some 1,200 
Germans arrived in Seville. On December 1, 1,500 Germans landed at Cadiz 
while at the same time a force of 2,500 landed at Vigo. By the first 
week of January 1937, United States sources estimated that there were
approximately 12,000 Germans in Spain and that eighty percent of the Rebel
37airforce was German. While the Condor Legion was a highly specialized 
air attack and defense unit, it was used primarily for the tactical support 
of Franco's ground forces. The German planes and artillery made a major 
contribution to Franco's eventual victory.
The Condor Legion was reinforced with airforce personnel and a few 
army specialists, but its total strength never exceeded 20,000 men. The 
Condor Legion personnel were constantly being rotated by General Goering 
in an effort to provide extensive combat experience for a large number of
^^General Adolf Galland, The First and the Last, (London, 1955), 26. 
As taken from Thomas, 317-
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men. Those who were selected for the Spanish tour of duty were under 
strict orders to maintain absolute silence concerning their activities in 
Spain. The commanders of the Legion were also rotated. Field Marshal 
Hugo Sperrle returned to Germany in November 1937 to take command of the
38air fleet based at Munich. His successor, General Volkmann, held 
command until November of 1938. Volkmann was later put in charge of the 
Luftkriegsacademie. The last commander of the Legion was General Wolfram 
von Richthofen, who served as Chief of Staff for both Sperrle and Volkmann.
General Faupel, German Chargé d'Affaires in Spain, reported to Berlin 
on December 10 that Franco's successes in the first six weeks were because 
of his use of Moroccan troops and the lack of coordination on the Loyalist's 
side. The Loyalists had since increased their resistance through the use 
of Russian war material and a certain amount of political and military 
cooperation among their ranks. To.counteract this new resistance. Franco 
needed more arms and ammunition. Fuapel also recommended that the German 
officers training Spanish officer material in the methods of modern war­
fare must be increased by sending to Spain all available German officers 
who served as instructors in South America. Again Faupel requested that 
Berlin dispatch an effective German army unit trained in offensive tactics. 
This unit could be used to achieve a breakthrough on the Madrid Front which 
at present had developed into a stalemate. Friction between the various 
German officials in Spain was indirectly mentioned by Faupel when he 
ended his dispatch by noting that he was in no way interfering with the 
work of Sperrle or Funk, the German military advisor to Franco, but was
8^Ceneral Hellmuth Volkmann. (I886-). German General of Aviation. 
Commander of the Condor Legion, Nov. 1, 1937-Nov. 1, 1938.
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supporting their efforts.3^
The latent quarrel between the NSDAP and the German military came to 
the surface in Spain. These troubles continued throughout the civil war. 
The basic point of contention was the problem of which German official 
held authority in what sphere of activity. A rivalry developed between 
Scheele and Bernhardt as to which one was Hitler's personal delegate to 
Franco. There also existed a mutual hatred between Sperrle and Faupel 
because of Sperrle's criticisms of Hisma. Eventually both of them were 
recalled by Berlin.
Until December, there was little if any coordination or cooperation 
between the War Ministry and the Foreign Ministry concerning the Spanish 
aid program. In fact, the Nazi party controlled most of the deliveries 
to and from Spain in cooperation with the War Ministry but without con­
sulting the Foreign Ministry. As early as October 16, Goering complained 
of a lack of adequate personnel. Rudolph Hess, Nazi party Secretary, put 
the whole foreign organization of the NSDAP at Goering's disposal. Eber- 
hard von Jagwitz, the head of the Party's foreign office, now worked 
directly under Goering. The German Foreign and Economic Ministries 
were not notified of the activities of the NSDAP or of the existence of 
Rowak and Hisma until mid-October. The Foreign Ministry's ignorance of 
the activities of the Nazi party and the War Ministry became evident on 
December 2 when the War Ministry agreed with Weizsaecker's^^ request of
19GFD., 159-162.
^^Ernst von Weizsaecker. (1882-1951) Director of Political Dept, 
of the Foreign Ministry, 1936-1938. State Secretary, 1938-19^3-
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November 30 that there should be more cooperation between the two
ministries. Despite their demand for more coordination of policy, the
Foreign Ministry remained badly informed of the activities of Goering's
agents in Spain throughout the German involvement in the Spanish Civil 
hiWar.
On December 1$, Neurath, in response to the continual requests by
Faupel and Sperrle for regular German army divisions in Spain, informed
the War Ministry that he was not in favor of sending such divisions to
Spain while the Great Powers in the Non-Intervention Committee attempted
to limit the conflict and bring about mediation. Neurath's position in
regard to the Spanish situation had always been of extreme caution. He
opposed the original Spanish request for German aid on July 25, and on
August 2h convinced Hitler that it was advantageous for Germany to agree
to the French embargo plan for prohibiting the exportation of war materials 
hpto Spain.
The High Command of the A m y  and the War Ministry supported Neurath's 
position regarding the dispatch of regular army units to Spain. Despite 
the German attitude, Hassel, the German ambassador to Italy reported that 
Mussolini was going ahead with his planned shipments of regular Italian 
troops to S p a i n . The inclination in Berlin seemed to be that Germany 
would not exceed the quantity of aid already given to Franco. It was 
decided to let Italy take the lead in providing Franco with combat troops.^
^^GFD., lh9,
hpIbid., 168. 
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At the end of 1936 the failure of the Rebel offensive against Madrid^ 
despite the use of German Incendiary bombs, caused gloom among the 
nationalists and their foreign supporters. The Loyalists' Increased 
resistance was evident along the entire front.
In January, French newspapers printed alarmist reports of large 
German troop concentrations In Spanish Morocco. The reports went on to 
say that these forces had practically taken over the economic resources 
of the area. The French government was particularly alarmed over these 
developments since. If true, they represented a decisive threat to French 
security In North Africa. The French government Immediately reacted to 
these reports by concentrating troops along the border of the French 
zone of Morocco. On January 9, France reminded the officials In the 
Spanish zone of Morocco of the French-Spanlsh convention of November 2T, 
1912, In which Spain agreed not to alienate any of her rights In the 
Spanish zone to a third party. On January 11, Hitler, In a speech before 
foreign diplomats In Berlin, assured the French Ambassador, Françols- 
Ponçet, that Germany had no territorial ambitions In Spanish Morocco 
or In Spain. In a more public manner, the official German press organs 
spoke of the whole affair as a French attempt to discredit Germany.
In the meantime. General Faupel Informed the Foreign Ministry on January 9  
that the only German units in Spanish Morocco was a squadron of seven 
seaplanes at Mellila.
During the month of January, Germany decided upon her basic military
^^J.C. DeWllde, Foreign Policy Reports, "The Struggle Over Spain," 
Vol. 14, (New York, April 1938), 15-16.
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policy towards aiding the Spanish rebels. Franco's request for more aid 
resulted in an Italo-German military conference scheduled for January 
l4 in Rome. The German delegation was led by General Hermann Goering, 
while Mussolini headed the Italian delegation. At this meeting it was 
decided that no additional German personnel would be sent to Spain other 
than replacements, and that further German contributions to Franco's war 
effort would be in military supplies only. Both Mussolini and Goering 
agreed that final efforts to aid Franco should be completed by January 31, 
and that dilatory tactics should be applied to the British control pro- 
posais in the Non-Intervention Committee until then. This was decided 
in expectation of the success of Franco's offensive against Madrid.
They also agreed that under no circumstances would they allow the widening 
of the civil war into a general European war.
The German Foreign Ministry was evidently still in the dark as to 
what direction German policy towards Spain would take in the future. 
Unaware of what had been decided upon in Rome, Baron von Weizsaecker 
remarked that the Spanish adventure was to be abandoned. The problem 
was how to withdraw from Spain gracefully. Evidently the Foreign 
Ministry was anxious to withdraw from Spain because of the international 
consequences of continued German presence there. In any event the 
Foreign Ministry was interested in cooperating with the London Non- 
Intervention Committee in attempting to limit the spread of the civil 
war into a European war.
1 3 5. GFDy, 226-2 2 7,
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The failure of Franco's January offensive against Madrid disappointed 
German officials who "believed that once Madrid fell, the civil war would 
end in a Rebel victory. They now believed that an end to the civil war 
would be put off indefinitely and that a mediated peace would ultimately 
mean a Loyalist victory unless Franco mobilized his heretofor untapped 
reserve manpower and received more German equipment. Germany at this 
time was still not interested in attaining greater influence in the 
planning and executing of Rebel offensives. Germany was well aware that 
undue interference in the Rebel conduct of the war would only arouse the 
proverbial Spanish individualism and xenophobia. If Germany did agree 
to a joint German-Italian command and greater influence in the conduct 
of the war, it would be burdened with a responsibility for the course 
of operations which, up till now, it had avoided assuming.
On January 25, the German Foreign Ministry received Franco's 
opinion on the January l4th Rome decisions. Franco protested that, because 
of the recent inability to capture Madrid, he needed more war material 
than what was decided upon at the Rome conference. Franco also pointed 
out that if after January 31 Germany and Italy agreed to the British 
proposals to establish a control system preventing materials from 
reaching Spain, the effect of such a control system would work to the dis- 
advantage of the Rebels. In order to obtain needed supplies. Franco 
told General Faupel on February T; that he would agree to the establishment 
of a joint German-Italian general staff consisting of five German and
^^GFD., 55 -̂ 
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five Italians. Both Faupel and Roatta took this under consideration 
and agreed to report hack to Franco after consulting their governments.
After repeated attempts to convince the Berlin authorities of Franco's 
need for more war material, Faupel finally enlisted the support of the 
Italian ambassador to Spain, Maneini, and Lieutenant Colonel Funck,
German military observer to Franco's general staff, in requesting more 
aid for the Rebels. In a dispatch to Berlin on April 21, Faupel reported 
that the civil war could not be won if it continued to be waged in its 
present manner. Both Faupel and Maneini were in favor of making further 
German and Italian aid to Franco conditional on more influence to German 
and Italian officers upon operations, and upon the training of more 
Spanish recruits by German and Italian advisors.
Ihe Rebel forces followed the recommendations of the German 
advisors during the winter offensives against Madrid. This was evident 
on January 5̂  when the Rebel forces employed blitzkrieg tactics while 
attacking the Loyalist's positions. Intense bombing was followed by 
the advance of tanks and mobile artillery, and then by infantry waves 
supported by more t a n k s . T h e s e  tactics had the effect of creating a 
breach in the Loyalist's lines but did not enable the Rebel forces to 
achieve a lasting penetration because of the lack of supporting troops 
and material.
In the spring of 1937, the Rebel's continual hammering against the 
Madrid defenses failed to make progress against the civilian resistance 
supported by International Brigades and Russian war material. Franco
^^Thomas, 3^9-
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therefore decided to begin the subjugation of the northern provinces 
which were effectively cut off from foreign or Loyalist assistance. The 
Rebel military command thought that this area would be relatively easy 
to conquer and by doing so would provide a much needed victory to bolster 
Nationalist prestige. The Basque iron ore, as well as the industries of
Bilbao were additional reasons for undertaking this offensive. Also, the
conquest of these provinces would remove pressure on the Rebel rear and 
enable thousands of troops to be transferred to the Madrid front. Generals 
Mola and Davila commanded the Northern army which was to advance against 
Bilbao and Santander. The Army of the North contained a mixture of 
Italian and Spanish ground troops supported by the Spanish airforce,
the Italian expeditionary airforce, and the Condor Legion. The total
number of aircraft in support of the Army of the North amounted to 
approximately 120 planes.
Preceding the offensive against the northern provinces, German 
bombers and fighter planes carried out an intensified bombing of Basque 
towns in order to weaken the Loyalist's defenses. On January k, Bilbao 
was raided by nine Junkers 52 escorted by Heinkel fighter planes. This: 
indiscriminate bombing of open towns and non-military areas created deep 
hatred and resentment against Germany.
On March 31, the Condor Legion bombed the country town of Durango, 
a road and railway junction between Bilbao and the front. The resultant
^^Claude G. Bowers, ^  Mission ̂  Spain: Watching the Rehearsal for
World War II, (ifew York, 195"577~33B'. Hereafter cited as Bowers.
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destruction of the town included indiscriminate bombing of non-military 
civilian areas. 5he death toll inflicted by the German planes amounted 
to 15 .̂ Claude Bowers^ United States Ambassador to Spain at the time, 
wrote in his book. My Mission to Spain, that this was "the most terrible 
bombardment of a white civil population in the history of the world up 
to March 3I; 1937-^^ But this German crime against humanity was soon 
surpassed in destructiveness and barbarity by the Condor Legion’s total 
annihilation of the Basque's holy city of Guernica.
As the ancient capital of the Basques, Guernica stood for centuries 
as the center of Basque religion, liberty and independence. It was here 
that the Catholic sovereigns Ferdinand and Isabella granted the Basque 
liberties which were renewed as recently as 1931 by the Republic. 
Guernica is a small town in the province of Vizcaya, lying in a valley 
ten kilometers from the sea and thirty from Bilbao. On April 26, General 
Mola ordered a punitive raid on Guernica in retaliation for the stiff 
resistence put up by the Basque troops. German Heinkels 111 and Junkers 
52 carried out a three hour bombardment of the market area of the town 
where 7,000 people had gathered for their weekly market day. 1,65^
people were killed and op9 wounded. Incendiary bombs gutted the town 
and left it in a blazing fury after the planes departed.
This senseless bombing of populated civilian areas produced a furor 
of protest in the world press . General Faupel was instructed by the 
German Foreign Ministry to request Franco to issue a strong denial that
^^Bowers, 3 ^ 3.
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German fliers were responsible. The official German newspapers in the 
meantime blamed the destruction on the retreating Basque communists.
In London; British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden refused to issue a 
communique asked for by Ribbentrop against the false reports concerning 
Guernica. There were rumors that Eden would propose an international 
investigation. Hitler expressed the view that Germany could not 
consider an investigation of the incident. Hermann Goering, Commander- 
in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, was later to admit at the Nuremburg War Trials 
that Guernica was regarded as a testing ground for the German airforce.
In the meantime, the Army of the South, under the command of General 
Queipo de Llano, was not idle. On January 17, a rebel offensive began 
against the large Spanish port of Malaga, located on the south-east 
coast of Spain. The offensive continued throughout January, and on 
February J the Army of the South captured the city.
The victory at Malaga coincided with a new Rebel offensive to the 
south-east of Madrid in the valley of the Jarama river. The Rebel force 
consisted of five mobile brigades, six l^^mm. batteries, and a German 
artillery group of'88mm.guns. The objective of the offensive was the 
Madrid to Valencia road, which was the remaining line of communication 
between the defenders in Madrid and the Republican government at Valencia. 
After two weeks of fighting, a stalemate resulted with the Rebels failing 
in their objective, but penetrating some fifteen kilometers into Loyalist 
territory. Both sides suffered approximately 25,000 casualties.
55QFD., $79.
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From March 30 tc June 19; the Army of the North concentrated on
capturing Bilbao ; the major industrial and mining center in Spain. By
the first week of May^ the Basque defenders had been driven back to their
last defensive positions outside of Bilbao. The Condor Legion continued
their bombing runs. The Germans were experimenting with the idea of
dropping large numbers of small incendiary bombs on wooded areas to force
the Loyalists to leave their positions. MeanwhileNeurath was in Rome
conferring with Mussolini. The Duce told him that Germany and Italy
had made enough sacrifices for Franco and that he, Mussolini, would
inform Franco that the Italian troops would be withdrawn if the Rebels
57did not conduct the war more energetically. This type of outburst was 
characteristic of Mussolini. He had invested an immense amount of men 
and material in Spain despite the economic dislocations that the Abyssinian 
affair created in the Italian economy. Neither the Italian economy nor 
Mussolini’s pride could withstand a long continuation of the civil war.
By the end of May, Germany had poured approximately I50 million 
Reichmarks into Spain. If the present rate of deliveries continued, there 
would be an additional, five or six million Reichmarks worth of war 
materials delivered monthly to the Rebels. The deliveries after May were 
to be paid for in cash, contrary to the previous German policy of advancing 
the Spanish Rebels credit for the purchase of German war materials.
On June 23, the German navy decided to withdraw most of its war vessels 
from Spanish waters. For the time being there remained a force consisting
Thomas , 737 ■
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of one cruiser, four torpedo boats, and two U-boats.59 Two days later, 
Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty, stated in the British House 
of Commons that according to British sources there were six destroyers, 
one armored ship, four submarines and two cruisers of the Germany n^wy 
operating in Spanish waters. This information was obtained by the British 
government prior to Germany's June 23 decision, for on July T, Cooper 
told the Commons that the British government now had information revealing 
that there were three submarines, one armored ship and one cruiser of the 
German fleet in Spanish w a t e r s . Rumors in London had it that the 
reason for the reduction of German war vessels in the Mediterranean was 
that high German naval officers in Berlin had protested to Hitler that 
the sending of the German ships to the Mediterranean increased the risk 
of having the cream of the German navy bottled up in the event of a 
general European conflict. Whether or not this was the real reason for 
the reduction of German ships, it was evident that Germany placed more 
emphasis upon increasing the combat efficiency of the Rebel navy than 
on using a large number of its own ships in support of the Rebels.
After the final collapse of Loyalist resistance in the Basque 
provinces on June 19, General Franco paused before mounting his offensive 
against Santander, a major Loyalist port on the Bay of Biscay. During 
this pause the Loyalists surprized the Rebel forces by launching an 
offensive against the Rebel positions ten miles west of Madrid at Brunete. 
Immediately Franco sent reinforcements from the Army of the North in order
60Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 326, 
(London, 1937), 320-322. Hereafter cited as Pari. Debates.
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to halt the Loyalist advance. The Condor Legion and heavy artillery were
also dispatched. On July 24, the Nationalists succeeded in stopping the
Loyalist advance and instigating a counter-attack. But further Rebel
advancement was. held up by Franco who wanted to concentrate on taking
Santander. The Brunete offensive cost the Loyalists 25,000 men and about
6l100 aircraft. The Rebel forces lost 23 aircraft and 10,000 men.
German officers were quick to learn the tactical significance of the 
battle of Brunete for the use of the tank. The Loyalist’s tanks were 
ineffective since they were spread out in support of infantry and thus 
could be attacked and destroyed individually. The Rebels, upon the 
insistance of the German General von Thoma, concentrated their tanks upon 
one point and thus used the tank force as a penetrating spear, followed 
by waves of infantry.
General Faupel informed Berlin that in his opinion once the Brunete 
crisis was over, Franco should continue his prepared offensive against 
Santander. Resumption of the Madrid offensive should be avoided. Faupel 
also noted that the Spanish forces lacked men trained in attack methods, 
and therefore requested that a number of such assault divisions be sent 
to Spain. This request had previously been refused by both the German 
High Command and the Foreign Ministry. Faupel’s advice was subsequently 
heeded by Franco, for a new offensive against Madrid was not initiated 
but rather the northern campaign against Santander began.
During July, the British acquired a new prime minister, Neville
^^Thomas, 461-462.
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Chamberlain. British diplomacy under Chamberlain aimed at appeasing 
Hitler and Mussolini more energetically than had been done under Stanley 
Baldwin. Britain’s primary aim was to secure friendship with Italy.
This was attempted on the assumption that better British-Italian relations 
could also result in the easing of French-Italian tensions and could 
conceivably bring about a settlement of the Spanish crisis through a 
mediated peace. But British diplomacy in this direction flounder upon 
the continued shipments of Italian troops and war material to the Spanish 
Rebel forces. The increased Italian commitment to a Rebel victory resulted 
not only in further estrangement of British-Italian relations but in the
63
closer cooperation between Italy and Germany.
In mid-August the Army of the North began its offensive against 
Santander. The Rebel forces consisted of I06 battalions supported by
64
63 batteries and the Condor Legion. Because of their overwhelming 
superiority of air power, the Rebel victory on August 2% was never in 
doubt. Coinciding with the Santander campaign was the intensification 
of attacks on merchant ships in the Mediterranean.
Franco become alarmed at the reports of increased Soviet shipping 
reaching the Loyalists. He therefore requested help from Mussolini and 
the Italian navy in order to stop such shipments. Mussolini agreed, and 
during the month of August, Russian, British, French, and other neutral 
ships were attacked in the Mediterranean by Italian submarines and 
aircraft operating from Majorca. During the last of August the raids on
^^Neville Chamberlain. (l869“194o) British statesmanj prime minister.
1937-1 9 4 0.
^8italy had joined the German^Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact on Nov­
ember 6, 1937" On December 11 of the same year, Italy withdrew from the 
League of Nations.
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merchant shipping increased, culminating in the August 31st submarine
65attack on the British destroyer Havock.
Because of this increased threat to commercial shipping in the Mediter­
ranean, the British government decided to accept a French proposal calling 
for a conference of Mediterranean powers. On September 6, the British 
and French governments jointly issued invitations to Germany, Italy, Russia, 
Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Bulgaria and Rumania to send 
representatives to a conference beginning on September 10 at Ryon, Switzer­
land. In the meantime, the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden explained 
to Ernst Woermann,^^ German Charge d’Affaires in London, that the confer­
ence would deal only with the attacks upon commercial shipping in,the 
Mediterranean. There was no desire to exclude Germany from the Confer-
67
ence. Germany replied to the invitation on September 9 by recalling 
the Deutschland and Leipzig incidents,and the British and French lack 
of response to help Germany protect her ships. Germany proposed that the 
Conference be referred back to the London Non-Intervention Committee.
The Conference met as scheduled despite the German and Italian non- 
participation. On September l4 the participating states reached an 
agreement. It was decided to counter-act with force any attacks made 
upon merchant vessels in the Mediterranean. The Ryon agreements had the 
effect of making Italian interference with Russian aid to the Spanish 
Loyalists extremely difficult. Because of this, Germany and Italy had to
^^Ibid.
^^Dr. Ernst Woermann. Official in the German Foreign Ministry, 1933” 
1936. Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain, 1936-1938- Director of the 
Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, 1938-19^3-
"̂̂ GFD. , 4 38.
^^See Chapter II.
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increase their aid to Franco.
In the meantime, the Germans in Spain were quarreling among them­
selves . General Sperrle, commander of the Condor Legion and General 
Faupel, official German representative to the Rebel government, mutually 
disliked each other. Sperrle refused to see Faupel and was also critical 
of the Hisma monopoly. Franco requested that Faupel be recalled, partly 
because of his close relations with the Falange, but chiefly because 
of his heavy-handed arrogance. This was also due, no doubt, to Faupel's
continual interference with France's conduct of the war. Faupel was
70replaced by Eberhard von Stohrer, in late August. Sperrle himself 
was shortly recalled, being succeeded in command by General Volkmann.
By mid-August, Ciano was optimistic over military developments in 
Spain. The offensive against Santander proceeded successfully and the 
Italian naval activities in the Mediterranean resulted in the sinking 
of seven ships off the Spanish coast. But he was still apprehensive over 
the long duration of the war and the cost it involved for Italy. On 
August 16, he stated to the German ambassador to Italy, von Hassell, 
that "the most important thing now was to clear up the Spanish question 
which had been dragging on much tcc long; settlement of other questions
71would become considerably easier after that."
The Loyalists attempted another diversionary offensive during 
August, this time on the Aragon front. It was undertaken in an effort 
to draw off some of France's men and material from the Rebel offensive 
in Asturias. To some degree it was successful, since the absence of
Dr. Eberhard von Stohrer. (l883-19^^)* German ambassador to Spain, 
1937-19^3- Recalled for failing tc prevent the downfall of Serrano Suner.
^^GFD., 434.
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of the Condor Legion prolonged the Rebel advance on Oviedo. Though the 
Loyalist pressure continued along the Aragon front until mid-October, it 
did not produce the desired result of checking the Rebel advance on 
Oviedo which was finally taken on October 21. With the fall of Oviedo, 
organized Loyalist resistance in the northern provinces collapsed.
The war in the north, the Basque, Santander and Asturias campaigns, 
had been important for the use of an overwhelming air and artillery 
superiority. It was at this time that the Condor Legion developed the 
tactic of carpet bombing. This tactic involved flying in close formation 
very low, and releasing all the bombs simultaneously, thereby producing 
a devistating effect upon the entrenched Loyalists. The conquest of 
the Northern provinces, l8, 600 square kilometers of land and I-I/2  
million people, brought the Rebels the Asturian coal fields and the 
industries of Bilbao. They also gained the north coast of Spain, en­
abling the entire Nationalist Navy to concentrate in the Mediterranean, 
and thereby create a stronger blockade of the Loyalist ports. The
collapse of the Northern front enabled Franco to transfer 65,000 men of
72the Army of the North to the Madrid front.
There was a temporary quiet along all fronts in Spain following 
the Asturias and Aragon campaigns. This lull lasted from mid-October 
until mid-December. The Rebel army now consisted of about 600,000 troops. 
It was divided into 65O battalions of infantry, one division of cavalry, 
and supported by 29O artillery batteries plus 600 aircraft. This main 
body was sub-divided into three groups; the Army of the North, the Army
Thomas, 480-48l,
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of the Center, and the Army of the South under the respective commands 
of Generals Davila, Saliquet, and Queipo de Llano. German and Italian 
aircraft made up the majority of the Rebel airforce. These planes in-
73eluded Junkers 52 and Savoias 73, Fiats 32, Heinkels and Messerschmitts.
Franco's plan for a new offensive against Guadalajara in mid-December 
was interrupted on December 15 by a Loyalist attack on Teruel, the tip 
of the Rebel salient into Loyalist territory. The salient extended 
approximately 50 miles into Loyalist territory at a width of 25 miles. 
German and Italian advisors urged Franco to continue with his plans for 
attacking Guadalajara in spite of the Loyalist offensive. Franco hesi­
tated until December 23, when the political necessity of recapturing 
Teruel became extremely important. Franco's war effort was financed 
through foreign and private backing and he could not risk the possibility 
of being forced into a defensive position. Any signs that the Rebel 
forces were weakening, would have grace consequences for the continuation 
of financial support.
On December 2Q, the Rebels began their counter-offensive. As always, 
the Condor Legion supported the ground forces by establishing air 
superiority. Because of being constantly moved from one area to another,
the headquarters of the Condor Legion was set up in a twelve car train
74for mobility purposes. More German and Italian planes participated
75in the battle of Teruel than at any one time during World War I.
At this time, the Italians renewed their demands on Franco for an
73ibid., 488.
^^Thomas, 505~506. 
^^Bowers, 372.
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early military decision. They thought that this could be best accom­
plished through a unified German-Italian command. Germany, while not 
actually refusing this idea, was cautious. Weizsaecker commented that 
although a unified command might have advantages, such a command would 
burden Germany with a responsibility that eventually might prove harmful 
to German diplomacy. Weizsawcker's attitude was justified, since if
ry /
there had been a unified command during the battle of Guadalajara,
Germany would have received the same loss of prestige for the defeat as 
77had the Italians.
On January 2, Weizsaecker informed the Italian Charge
d'Affaires, Magistrati, that Germany would not favor a unified command
in Spain. Germany preferred instead, direct personal influence on
Franco. General Blomberg, Minister of War, supported Weizsaecker's 
T8position.
The controversy over a unified command had been raging since 1936. 
The Italians were especially interested in establishing a unified command 
for reasons of prestige, and also because they thought that Franco was 
making poor use of the Italian troops and conducting the war in a slow 
and not altogether successful way. Both Faupel and his successor 
Stohrer requested the establishment of such a command. From a purely 
military standpoint, a unified command was desirable since this would 
enable the Germans and Italians to operate independently from Franco and
ry /
March 8-13, 1937- Italy suffered a humiliating defeat. German 
advisors attributed the defeat to the inability of the Italian troops to 
wage modern warfare.
'̂ ĜFD. , 543-
78Ibid., 544.
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have greater influence over his operations. But Berlin, for political 
reasons, was not ready to assume the increased responsibility that a 
greater influence on the Rebel war effort would burden them with.
During January and February the Germans assumed a cautious attitude 
toward the Spanish adventure. On February 1, Stohrer requested infor­
mation from Berlin as to whether or not Germany would follow the Italian 
lead and continue to supply Franco. In Stohrer's opinion. Franco 
desperately needed this aid, and unless pressured by Germany and Italy, 
he would not assume the risk of any major action. For this reason, 
demands for more German influence on the conduct of the war should 
accompany any additional German aid to Franco. Weizsaecker answered by 
stating that no decision would be made on military policy in Spain until 
it was seen how Franco recovered from the Loyalist offensive against 
Teruel.
Evidently the reason for the Foreign Ministry's hesitancy to lay
down any definite military policy towards Spain at this time was because
of the impending political and military shakeup in Berlin. During
February, Hitler ousted Blomberg from the War Ministry and appointed
himself to the post. Hitler also reorganized the army by creating the
High Command of the Arpiy, and placing it under his personal control.
80
General Wilhelm Keitel was appointed as Chief of the High Command. 
Hitler's reorganization plans also included the Foreign Ministry.
T^GFD , 575.
GOwilhelm Keitel. (1882-1946). Chief of the OKW, 1938-1945.
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Foreign Minister Neurath was replaced by Joachim von Ribbentrop,formerly 
ambassador to Britain and one of Hitler’s lackeys.
One of Ribbentrop's first functions as Foreign Minister yas to assure 
the Spanish ambassador to Germany that the Reich would continue its policy 
of supporting Nationalist Spain. Hitler also reiterated Germany's desire 
to combat any attempts to bolshevize Spain, and added that Germany had 
no territorial ambitions in Spain.
While assuring the Spanish Rebels of its continued support, Germany 
was still uncertain as to whether or not to continue sending aid to 
Franco. Future German policy towards Spain depended upon the success oh 
failure of the present Italo-British negotiations for a general settle­
ment of outstanding difficulties between the two countries. Since be­
coming prime minister, Chamberlain, contrary to the wishes of his 
Foreign Secretary, attempted to come to an understanding with Italy con­
cerning the Mediterranean and Italian withdrawal from. Spain. Eden was 
not opposed to reconciliation with Italy, but was opposed to the policy 
of appeasement which would ultimately be at the expense of British interests 
and security. Germany had to adapt its policy to any agreement between 
Britain and Italy, or to any agreement reached in the London Non-Inter­
vention Committee on the question of withdrawing foreign volunteers from 
Spain. Thus, Germany was anxious to convince Franco that he must make 
maximum use of German and Italian volunteers in the next few months in 
order to deliver a decisive military blow before the possibility of having 
to withdraw German and Italian volunteers became a reality.
^^Joachim von Ribbentrop. (1893-1946). Ambassador-at-Large, 1935- 
1938. Ambassador to Britain, 1935-1938. Reich Foreign Minister 1938-
1945.
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On March k, Franco Informed Stohrer that guerilla activities and 
military incompetence of the local commander at Teruel were responsible 
for the delay in his operations. He assured Stohrer that present strategic 
plans would achieve an early victory before the question of volunteers 
became acute. The offensive that Franco referred to was the buildup of 
troops and material for the March 9 Rebel counter-offensive against 
the Loyalist positions at Teruel.
At the end of March Germany was still pressuring Franco for a quick 
decisive military blow that would result in a Rebel victory. On March 
30; General Volkmann, received instructions from the War Ministry to 
urge Franco to continue military operations until all of Catalonia fell,
82and not to divert his attention to other fronts .
The entire Condor Legion supported the March 9 Rebel offensive 
against Catalonia. The Legion now consisted of eight squadrons of 
Messerschsmitts 109, four squadrons of Heinkels 51, a reconnaissance 
group of Heinkels and Derniers I7 and twelve squadrons of Heinkels III 
and Junkers 52. The tank corps comprised approximately I80 tanks, while
83the anti-tank units numbered thirty companies.
During March and April the Loyalist resistance collapsed in the 
face of overwhelming Rebel air superiority. Franco used his aircraft 
to drive the Loyalists from their positions and then over-run the area 
with infantry supported by tanks. From this battle the German observers
82GFD., 628.
^^Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill, (London, 1948). F. 0. 
Miksche, Blitzkrieg, "(l̂ ondon 1941 ), 8I. As taken from Thomas, 519-
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learned a great deal about the use of fighter planes for supporting 
infantry. By April 15^ the Rebel forces succeeded in reaching the 
Mediterranean coast and thus opening a wedge between the two principle 
Loyalist cities of Valencia and Barcelona.
In view of the rapid advance of the Nationalists, Germany concluded 
that its volunteers could start withdrawing from Spain without hindering 
Franco's war effort. Mounting tensions in Eastern Europe and the 
concluding of Anglo-Italian agreement on April 6, made the German High 
Command unenthusiastic about supplying the Nationalists with more men 
and material. Franco agreed, but on the condition that the Condor Legion 
would leave behind its aircraft, anti-aircraft guns and other equipment
84for use by German trained Spanish pilots. On April o, Weizsawcker 
asked Magistrati, Italian Chargé d'Affaires, to cable Rome for Mussolini's 
reaction to the withdrawal of German troops. Germany needed these troops 
at home for assimilation into an expanded training program. The 
Italian reply on June 8 stated that Italy had no intention of recalling 
its troops at this time despite the Italian-British agreement, but that 
they might be reduced.
In the meantime. Franco changed his mind. On April 27, he informed 
Stohrer that the Condor Legion would be of utmost value until final 
victory was assured.Franco's change of heart was probably because 
of the increased resistance of the Loyalists who were receiving supplies 
from France since the opening of the Pyrenean frontier on March 17-
^^Ibid., 640.
GFD., 647.
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During June^ reports from Stohrer, Volkmann and other German officials 
in Spain constantly stressed the need for re-equipping and re-supplying the 
Condor Legion. On June 11; General Volkmann cabled Berlin that no 
supplies had reached the Condor Legion since the beginning of March; and 
as a consequence the Legion was in urgent need of replacement parts and 
new equipment. The 88mm. anti-aircraft artillery had been completely 
worn out. The combat efficiency of the Legion had been reduced in half
87as a result of worn out equipment and combat losses. ' Both Eibbentrop 
and Keitel approached Hitler on the urgent need for re-supplying the 
Condor Legion; but it was not until the end of June that Germany finally 
decided to continue supplying the Legion with the necessary equipment 
to maintain its combat strength. These supplies were not delivered on 
the condition that further economic concessions from Franco be granted 
to Germany; but Stohrer was to inform Franco of Germany's desire to 
acquire certain mining rights in Spain.
Between the end of April and the end of JUly; the Rebel advancei 
along the Mediterranean coast continued with increased difficulty as the 
Rebels approached Valencia. Although the Loyalists received enough war 
materials from Franco to slow this advance; their source of supply was 
steadily drying up. On June 13; France; under pressure from Britain; 
closed the Pyrenean frontier. This was partly done in order to create a
favorable situation for Franco's acceptance of the plan for the with-
88drawal of volunteers decided upon in the Non-Intervention Committee.
^^Ibid.;
88See Chapter two. Franco did not accept this plan.
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On June 30, Generak Kindelan, Commander of the Spanish Airforce, 
approached Stohrer with the request that Spanish pilots be authorized to 
take over a complete squadron of the Condor Legion. The Spanish request 
was granted, but on the condition that these planes remained under 
German command.
As a result of the surprise offensive of the Loyalists along the
Ebro river during July, the Rebel forces once again desperately needed
supplies. On August l4, Bernhardt, director of Hisma, telegraphed
Berlin urging that supplies be sent immediately to Franco, especially
artillery ammunition and airplane engines. Goering was requested to
intervene personally so that these supplies would be delivered as quickly 
90as possible. By the end of August the Rebels succeeded in containing 
the Loyalist offensive. Both sides suffered immense losses in men and 
material but the Loyalist could least afford it, since they did not have 
the source of supplies that was available to the Rebels. Because of the 
weaknesses of both sides, four months of trench warfare followed.
During September of 1938 the Czech crisis preoccupied the attention 
of Europe. Franco was alarmed by this potentially dangerous situation 
because of the possibility of a general war in which he might have to 
contend with a French invasion. During the crisis, German aid temporarily 
stopped,because of the possible German needs in central Europe. Franco 
was annoyed at Germany for failing to inform him of its plans. However 
on September 19, Germany informed Count Antonio Magaz, the Rebel Ambassador
^GFD., 7 12. 
^Ibid., 735.
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to Germany^ that there would he no change in German aid to Spain even if
91war did come.
Franco became worried over Hitler’s promise to Chamberlain -during
the Munich conference on September 30 that Germany would withdraw her
volunteers from Spain if all foreign volunteers wéré withdrawn. To FrancO;
it seemed that this cooperation between Germany and Britain might lead to
a mediated peace in Spain. Franco’s apprehensions were not ill-founded,
for on October 2, Stohrer informed Berlin that Franco could not win a
military victory without extensive aid from Germany and Italy, and that
a peace by mediation would not necessarily be harmful to German interests.
In order to counteract the possibility of a mediated peace, Jordana
informed Stohrer on October 6 that a mediated peace in Spain would mean
that the civil war had been fought in vain. Franco, far from accepting
mediation, demanded that Germany deliver to Spain 500 heavy machine guns,
50,000 rifles, 1,500 light and 100 75mm. guns. Berlin agreed, but made
the delivery of the above material conditional upon the granting of
mining concessions to Germany. This arrangement did not take final
93form until November.
German policy concerning further aid to the Spanish Rebels was 
decided in Rome on October 28 in a conversation between Ribbentrop and 
Mussolini. Both agreed to continue sending supplies to Franco. As a 
result of this decision, German and Italian aid became quite extensive 
during the months of November and December of 1938 and January of 1939■
^^Thomas, 553■ 
^^GFD., 753. 
93ibid., 775.
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30,000 tons of material entered the Rebel port of Vigo during December 
a l o n e .Despite  the increased aid to Franco, General von Richthofen 
informed Goering that the Condor Legion would have to be tripled in order 
for Franco to win the war. Berlin did not agree and continued to follow 
its policy of sending only war material and not troops to Spain. The 
Condor Legion was maintained at its present number according to Hitler's 
November l8 decision.
The increased aid to the Rebels was a reversal of the direction that 
German policy had taken towards Spain during the earlier stages of the 
war. After the implementation of the Italo-British agreement on November 
1938,95 and after the Munich conference, it was evident to Germany that 
Britain and France would never go to war over Spain or anything for that 
matter. It seemed to Germany that the fears it earlier held concerning 
the dangers of the Spanish war spreading into a European conflict were 
groundless. This opinion was also encouraged in the autumn of 1938 by 
the Soviet Union’s change of policy towards Spain. After repeated 
attempts to affect a Russian-British-French alignment against Germany, 
the Soviet Union was finally persuaded by the results of the Munich 
conference that her interests would be better served by some sort of an 
understanding with Germany.9^ As was the case with Czechoslovakia, so 
it would be with democracy in Spain. The Spanish Republic would be 
sacrificed by the appeasement policies of British and French diplomacy
94 ,Bowers, 402,
95The condition for the agreement to come into effect was the with­
drawal of Italian troops from Spain. 10,000 left in the autumn of 1938.
9^Thomas, 612-613-
52
in order to prevent a general European war.
By January 3, the Rebel offensive against Catalona turned into a
rout with the collapse of the Loyalist defenses. For all extents and
purposes the civil war was now over.
With the end of the war in sight, Germany was anxious to withdraw
her volunteers from Spain. Therefore on March 1, the Foreign Ministry
instructed General von Richthofen to inquire of Franco as to a suitable
date for the withdrawal of the German contingent from Spain. Franco
replied that the Condor Legion could leave anytime after the first week
in May, for a victory parade was to take place in Madrid around that time.
In the meantime, Jbhannes Bernhardt was negotiating with the Rebel
government and Berlin as to the possibility of having Field-Marshal
Goering witness the embarkation of the Condor Legion. This was done
without the knowledge of the German Ambassador Stohrer who, once informed
of these negotiations, cabled Berlin immediately protesting the activities
of Bernhardt and threatening to resign his post if the impending visit
was not arranged through normal diplomatic channels. Stohrer added that
he had tolerated Bernhardt's Interference in the Embassy's relations
with Franco throughout the civil war for the sake of German unity of
97purpose, but now must demand that this interference be stopped. The
Foreign Ministry supported Stohrer's position and on May 8 instructed him
to inform Bernhardt to leave all negotiations with Franco to the German
Embassy. Stohrer was also to inform the Spanish government that he was
98taking over all arrangements for Goering's visit.
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Further negotiations between Stohrer and Franco resulted in failure
to agree to the time and place of the proposed meeting between Goering
and Franco. The whole plan was therefore cancelled and the Condor Legion
left Spain on May 22 without the presence of Goering. On arriving in
Hamburg on May 31; the Legion proceeded to Berlin to be review on June 6 
99by Hitler. By the end of June the evacuation of German and Italian 
military forces from Spain was complete.
The Condor Legion participated in almost every major action in the 
war. Its value to the Rebel forces was in its mobility and technical 
precision. The Legion was constantly being shifted from one front to 
another in order to provide the Rebels with not only air superiority, but 
with tactical support of the Spanish and Italian infantry. Their parti­
cipation in the war provided the German pilots with combat experience 
and the opportunity to experiment with new tactics such as carpet 
bombing and the use of incendiary bombs.
The principal activity of the German army in Spain was to train 
Spanish officers and officer-material in the methods of modern warfare. 
The German tank detachment that was sent to Spain under the command of 
General von Thoma, trained Spanish officers in the use of tanks, anti­
tank weapons and other technical machinery that was indispensable to a 
modern equipped army. The German army also established infantry, 
artillery, mortar and engineer schools in which 56,000 Spaniards received 
i n s t r u c t i o n . T h e  German army was not far behind the Luftwaffe in
^^Katharine Duff, Survey of International Affairs, "The War in Spain 
and its Repercussions," Vol. I, (London, 1938), 355-357-
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experimenting with new tactics at the expense of Spanish troops and 
civilians. In particular, the Germans observed that concentrated tank 
units were more effective against defensive positions than units which 
were spread out in support of infantry.
German military aid to the Spanish Rebels was decisive for the 
ultimate Rebel victory on three separate occasions. The first being the 
supply of transport aircraft in July of 1936 enabling Franco to airlift 
his Moroccan troops across the Straits of Gibraltar. Secondly, the heavy 
supplies sent to the Rebel forces early in 1937 prevented the possibility 
of a collapse of Rebel morale after having: failed to capture Madrid. 
Thirdly, the arrival of German war material enabled Franco to launch his 
successful Catalan campaign in December of 1938, thus providing the Rebels 
with enough material to overcome the last defensive position of the 
Loyalists. This material arrived when both sides were exhausted from 
the destructive battle of the Ebro and neither could, for lack of material, 
initiate an extensive counter-offensive. If German aid had failed to 
arrive, the possibilities for a compromise peace would have been greatly 
e n h a n c e d . T h e  dependable and efficient men and material that Germany 
supplied to Franco, enabled the Rebel forces to keep up a constant pressure 
on the Loyalists who, for lack of a similar sourse of supplies, were 
eventually overwhelmed.
bOlThomas, 612.
CHAPTER II 
GERMAN DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT OF THE 
SPANISH NATIONALISTS 
THE NON-INTERVENTION COMMITTEE
1936-1939
In addition to direct military and technical assistance, Germany 
also supported the Spanish Rebels through diplomatic channels, the forum 
being the London Non-Intervention Committee. German diplomatic support 
of the Rebels was not accomplished by singing the praises of the 
Nationalist’s cause or by rallying around the Rebel banner but rather 
by causing endless discussion and delay in the Committee and thereby 
reducing its effectiveness. The Committee's main concern was preventing 
foreign intervention in the Spanish Civil War, and various proposals 
were introduced to accomplish this task. Following the Italian lead, 
Germany attempted to delay passage of any proposals which would limit 
its ability to aid the Spanish Rebels.
Ey July 22, 1936, it was evident that the Spanish generals' attempt 
at a coup d'état was unsuccessful. The struggle in Spain evolved into a 
civil war with each side appealing for and receiving large amounts of war 
materials, from the interested European powers. It was because of this 
extensive aid to Spain, creating the danger of precipitating a European 
war, that Fiance on August 1, 1936 issued an appeal to the interested
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powers for an immediate adoption of a common policy of non-intervention
toward the Spanish conflict. At the same time, France announced that it
would retain its freedom of action concerning Spain pending the conclusion
1of a non-intervention agreement.
The Spanish Civil War created not only a division in the French 
cabinet but also a division of opinion among the French populace. At 
this time, the French government was a coalition government composed of 
elements of the left, combined under the leadership of Leon Blum and 
commonly referred to as the Popular Front. The cabinet was divided 
between the proponents of strict neutrality and those favoring aid to 
the Madrid government. Outside the cabinet, the French people were divided 
in a similar manner. Added to this internal division was the policy of 
the British government under Stanley Baldwin. Britain maintained its 
traditional policy of avoiding European entanglements and thereby 
leaving the French to face the consequences of any future French inter­
vention in favor of the Madrid government. The remaining, and in all 
probability the best course of action left to the Blum government was 
to have the major European powers agree to a policy of non-intervention.
The French note of August 1 proposed that an embargo be placed on 
all arms, ammunitions and implements of war by each of the interested 
states. This embargo would also apply to contracts for military equip­
ment entered into prior to the outbreak of the civil war. The national 
measures passed or decreed by each of the states, in fulfillment of the
^Puzzo.
57
obligations assumed under the non-intervention agreement, would be cir-
2culated among the states.
In a conversation on August 4 between the German Foreign Minister 
Baron von Neurath and the French ambassador to Germany, François-Poncet, 
Neurath stated that Germany did not need to make a declaration of neu­
trality since it did not interfere in domestic Spanish affairs. Germany 
was willing to consider discussions on the possibility of preventing
intervention by foreign powers, provided that all the interested countries
3
join such an agreement--especially the Soviet Union. On August 8, the 
German government was again pressured to adhere to the French note.
This time it was by the British Ambassador to Germany, Sir Nevile 
Henderson. Again Germany delayed action by explaining the difficulties 
of implementing such a plan and demanding that all countries with large 
munition plants also participate.^
Germany continued to find excuses for not adhering to the French 
proposal. Up till August 9, its two main conditions for agreement were 
that those countries with munition plants participate in the embargo of 
war materials and that the Soviet Union also agree to join. On August 9, 
Spanish authorities at Badajoz seized a German Junker transport plane.
The German government not only used this as another excuse to delay 
action on the embargo plan but also attempted to complicate matters 
further by threatening to break off relations with the Spanish government
^Vera Micheles Dean, "European Diplomacy in the Spanish Crisis," 
Foreign Policy Reports, XII (New York, 1937), 225. Hereafter cited as FPE.
^GFD., 2 9 .
^Ibid., 34.
if the crew and plane were net released.
In an effort to increase the diplomatic pressure on Germany; the 
governments of Britain and France transmitted to the German government 
a joint declaration in which they agreed to ban export of war materials 
as scon as similar declarations were made by Germany, Italy, Portugal, 
and Russia.^ Germany replied that it agreed in principle to the embargo 
plan but reiterated three conditions for accepting the plan as proposed 
by the French. 1) The Spanish government must release the captured plane 
and crew, 2) that all states possessing arms industries also join the 
ban, and 3) that the Soviet Union also agree to accept the non-intervention 
proposal. Included in the German reply was the suggestion that the non­
intervention proposals be extended to include volunteers.^
In order to quicken the diplomatic pace set by Germany, Britain 
unilaterally announced the imposition of an absolute ban on war materials 
exported to Spain. The effect of the British conciliatory measure was 
destroyed by the Spanish Loyalist's attack, seizure and search of the 
German steamship Kamerun on August 19, contrary to international law.
By August 24, Germany was in danger of being blamed for sabotaging 
the British-French attempts to affect an international agreement on the 
non-importation of war materials to Spain. Therefore on August 24, 1936
thy German government, in a note to the French embassy, formally agreed
7to adhere to the French embargo proposal.
5
Esch. 56.
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The agreements on the embargo of war materials to Spain had the 
effect of focusing international attention on the Spanish crisis. Also, 
in contradiction of traditional international practice, the embargo 
resulted in the denial of the right of the legally constituted Madrid 
government to purchase war materials on the world market. This effect 
prolonged the civil war by weakening the military position of the Spanish 
government. For Germany, the embargo act was a convenient screen behind 
which German aid to the Spanish rebels was diplomatically hidden, while 
aid to the Loyalist Spanish government was severely handicapped.
On August 29, the French government proposed the formation of a 
Non-Intervention Committee. Its task was to keep the participating 
states informed of the various measures that each of them implemented 
in order to comply with the obligations undertaken in adhering to the 
embargo agreement. The representatives of each government on the Committee 
were chosen from the respective embassies or legations currently ac­
credited to the British government.®
The German government was suspicious that the Committee would 
eventually become an organization with control powers and thus hamper 
German aid to the Rebels. Germany suggested to the French government 
that the Committee be dispensed with, and in its place the offices of 
the British government be used to inform the participating states of the 
measures taken by'.each member in implementing the embargo agreement.
Also, the British government could receive the complaints concerning 
violations of the embargo agreement. German compliance was conditional
®GF5., 63-64
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on the question of how the proposed Committee would function and the 
scope of its authority. In an attempt to get the German government to 
agree to the French proposal, the British and French gave assurances that 
the Committee would not become a control agency with extensive powers.
In their efforts to get Germany to agree to the establishment 
of a Committee, the British promised to eliminate the possibility of any 
control authority that the Committee might assume. This showed that the 
British were more concerned with limiting the danger of the Spanish 
conflict from becoming international in character than with prohibiting 
the importation of war materials into Spain. In order to placate Germany 
and Italy, the western democracies avoided aiding the legitimate 
government of Spain--a policy that was to lead to greater concessions 
and eventually to World War II.
On September 5, the German government, unwilling to assume the res­
ponsibility for defeating the French proposal, informed the British 
Charge d'Affaires in Berlin that Germany accepted the proposal to establish 
a Non-Intervention Committee in London. Germany was confident that its
present level of technical and material aid to Franco would enable him
9to achieve victory.
The German Foreign Ministry, in order to assure itself that the 
Committee would not assume control functions, instructed its representa­
tive on the proposed Committee to play a reserved role, to resist the
9 Esch. l8.
^^The official German representative on the Committee was Joachim 
von Ribbentrop, German ambassador to Britain, but the sessions of the 
Committee were usually attended by Ernst Woermann, German Chargé d®Affairs 
in Bri+ain
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Implementation of any controls, and to refer all matters to Berlin.
In its first session on September 9, and in subsequent sessions
throughout the month of September, the Non-Intervention Committee decided
upon its organization and procedure. Mr. W.S. Morrison, Financial
Secretary of the British Treasury, was chosen temporary chairman. On
September 21, he was succeeded by Lord Plymouth, British Under-Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, as permanent Chairman. The sessions of the Committee
were secret and at the end of each meeting a joint communique was issued 
12to the press.
A set of elaborate rules was adopted to deal with any alleged 
violations of the non-intervention agreement. Every complaint had to be 
addressed to the Committee in writing and had to be from an official 
source. Thus reporters, journalists and travelers were excluded. Once 
received by the Committee, the complaint was communicated to the govern­
ment accused of the violation. The accused government would then supply 
sufficient information to the Committee as to the veracity of the 
accusation and the facts surrounding the alleged violation. The Com­
mittee would then Investigate the charges. Unfortunately, it took an 
immense amount of time for any complaint to go through this lengthy pro­
cedure. Once passed this complicated machinery the complaint ran into
a deadend, for there was no provision for the application of any type of
11sanction against the violating government. The Committee was merely a
^^GFD., 78-81.
^^GFD., 182-1 8 4.
^^Padelford, 70»
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debating society that agreed to do nothing more than review the facts 
and evidence of each complaint brought before it.
The financial obligations of the Committee were met by contributions 
14from its members. The major powers of France^ Britain, Germany, rtaly 
and Bussia contributed proportionately larger amounts than the lesser 
powers. As in similar international organizations, the Committee was 
in constant financial difficulties because of the lack of contributions.
A sub-committee was established principally to assist the chairman 
in the day-to-day work of the Committee, but eventually it came to assume 
the powers of an executive organ of the Committee. Its members included 
France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Russia, Portugal, Belgium, Czechos­
lovakia and Sweden. Because of its procedure, the sub-committee could 
accomplish little without involving a long period of time.
From October to December of 1936, one of the main concerns of the 
Committee were the Russian complaints of German violations of the 
embargo agreement, and its subsequent threats to withdraw from the 
Committee. During this same period, the British attempted to negotiate, 
both Inside and outside of the Committee, for an observation and control 
system that would supplement the embargo agreement. Outside of the 
Committee, the German recognition of the Franco regime threatened to 
handicap efforts to establish the international policy of non-intervention 
towards the Spanish conflict.
lbCountries adhering to non-intervention: Albania, Austria, Belgium,
united Kingdom, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Irish Free State, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, The Nether­
lands, Norway, Portugal, Rcumania, Sweden, Turkey, Switzerland, Czechos­
lovakia and Poland.
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At the October 23 meeting of the Committee, Russia threatened to
withdraw from the Committee if German and Italian aid to the Rebels
continued. However, Russia softened its position somewhat by stating,
after diplomatic representations by London, Paris, and Prague, that it
would not be bound to the non-intervention agreements to any greater
15extent than the other participating powers. Thus the Russian threat 
to break up the Non-Intervention Committee and thereby create the 
possibility of greater foreign intervention in Spain was solved by 
diplomatic means outside of the Committee.
Since October, the members of the Committee had been aware of 
repeated violations of the embargo agreement by Italy and Germany and 
to a lesser extent by the Soviet Union. In an attempt to deal with 
these violations, the British government introduced in the sub-committee 
a plan calling for the posting of foreign observers in Spanish ports 
and along Spanish borders. The Committee on December 2 agreed to have 
the plan presented to the two Spanish factions, requesting their approval. 
At the same time, the sub-committee was instructed to examine the 
feasibility of prohibiting the entrance of volunteers into Spain. The 
question of volunteers became acute because of the increased rumors that 
composite units of the German and Italian armies were being sent to the 
assistance of Franco.
Germany reacted to the British plan by informing the British govern­
ment that despite the fact that Germany had introduced a measure con­
cerning volunteers during the discussions on the arms embargo earlier
^^FER., XII, 2 3 0.
16GFD., 150.
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that year, it was willing to agree to any proposal which would strengthen 
non-intervention. Agreement was on the condition that all members of the 
Committee participate. Repeated British and French notes to the German 
government caused Germany to reply that neither the question of volunteers 
nor the enforcement of the embargo accord should be discussed outside the 
committee.
Germany also emphasized that discussion of volunteers could only
take place in conjunction with other forms of indirect intervention--
ITthat is, financial aid. Germany's reasons for hesitating to reply to 
the continual British and French efforts to conclude an agreement were 
primarily because of the military situation in Spain. During December 
Franco, with his combined southern and northern armies, failed to capture 
Madrid because of the increased volume of Russian war materials arriving 
in Madrid, plus the arrival of a considerable number of international 
volunteers. A German agreement to the ban on volunteers at this time 
would seriously hamper the rebel war effort and damage the international 
prestige of the Fascist powers who publicly sided with the Rebels. Both 
Germany and Italy continued to assist the Rebels in order to counteract 
Russian aid.
The increased flow of war materials to Spain led Britain and France, 
on December 27, to communicate a joint note to Berlin, Rome, Lisbon and 
Moscow. The note stressed the danger of increased aid to Spain as a
18threat to international peace. Germany and Italy interpreted the
ITGFD., 1 6 7.
^®C-A. Thomson, "Spain: The Civil War," Foreign Policy Reports,
XII (New York, 1937), 267.
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British-Erench note as an attempt to maintain the superiority of the
19Madrid government over the Rebels. To forestall any immediate action
on the question of volunteers, Germany suggested to Britain and France
that the London committee study the possibility of removing all foreign
volunteers from Spain. On December 31, Neurath told the British and
French Ambassadors that although Germany was willing to localize the
20conflict, it would never tolerate a Communist Spain.
The German jure recognition of the Franco regime on November l8
struck a damaging blow to the efforts of the British and French to 
arrive at some sort of working agreement to establish an international 
policy of non-intervention towards the Spanish conflict. De jure 
recognition meant not only that the France regime became a member of 
the community of nations but that Germany was legally within its rights 
to aid France if the non-intervention agreements failed. German re­
cognition created the impression among the European powers that the 
Fascist states, in backing a Franco victory, would risk the possibility 
of a confrontation with the Soviet Union--Loyalist Spain's principal 
supporter. Thus, with both Spanish parties being recognized as the 
legitimate government of Spain, both the Soviet Union and the Fascist 
states could claim that they were helping a legally recognized government 
to defeat a rebel uprising. Such an attitude was precisely what the 
British and French, through the Non-Intervention Committee, were attempting 
to forestall.
^^GFD., 194-1 9 6.
^°Ibld.
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The new year opened with the German seizure of three Spanish ships 
on January 3, 1937 in retaliation for December 24 internment of the German 
steamer Palos by the Loyalist government. German policy, in light of the 
Loyalist actions against German vessels, was to intensify the raids on 
Spanish ships but not to take stronger action.
In the Non-Intervention Committee, the British observation and 
control plan was still being debated while war materials continued to 
be shipped to Spain in an ever increasing volume and number. Again the 
British and French endeavored, by diplomatic means outside of the 
Committee, to keep the Spanish conflict from spreading. "On January 9, 
the British government urged immediate national prohibitions upon 
recruiting of volunteers for Spain, and the assimilation of the vol­
unteering problem to the program of observation and control being worked
21by the Committee. . . . "
Germany was willing to consent to the ban on volunteers provided 
that an effective control system be adopted at the same time and the other 
members of the Committee also agree to the ban. Germany informed Franco 
of its attitude on January l4 and advised him to accept the control and 
observation scheme in principle but to stipulate certain conditions which 
would delay its enforcement.
On January 27, conversations between Goering and Mussolini took 
place in Rome. There was mutual agreement that Italian and German replies 
to the British note of January 9 be identical and express that both 
governments were willing to support the British proposal to stop volunteers
21Padelford, 72-73'
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from entering Spain. Both Goering and Mussolini agree that France was
sufficiently supplied with war materials to enable the Axis powers to
22cooperate with Britain and France.
In the meantime. Franco's negative reply to the British observation 
scheme called attention to the fact that any attempts to establish 
control observers on Spanish soil would be a limitation of Spanish 
sovereignty. This reply had the effect of forcing Germany and Italy, 
in replying to the British note on January 25, to state that they were 
in full agreement with the British proposal, but not with the proposal 
to place international observers on Spanish soil. The reply also stated 
that the two governments already created the necessary legislation pro­
hibiting the departure of volunteers to Spain. This legislation would g,_ 
into effect as soon as an effective system of control was agreed upon. 
They again referred to their proposal to withdraw volunteers already
23in Spain.
On March 8, the London committee reached agreement on the extension 
of the embargo to include volunteers. The members of the Committee also 
agreed to set up a land and sea observation patrol around Spain in order 
to enforce the embargo on volunteers and war materials. The purpose of 
the observation scheme was to provide a system by which all attempts to 
ship arms, ammunition and volunteers to Spain would be observed and 
reported to the Committee.
^^Malcolm Muggerridge (ed.), Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, (London, 
19^8 ), 8 5. Hereafter cited as Ciano.
23GFD., 237-238.
To administer the observation scheme, the Committee created an Inter­
national Board composed of representatives from Britain, Prance, Italy, 
Russia, Norway and Poland. Chairman of the Board was Vice-Admiral Dulm 
of the Netherlands. The International Board appointed administrators 
and deputy administrators, plus a corps of observing officers. The 
observing officers included I30 for the French-Spanish border and five 
for the Gibraltar-Spanish border, plus 550 for ship observation. The 
Portuguese-Spanish border was administered by 13O British observers.
The 550 ship observers mentioned above were part of the merchant vessel 
observation plan. This plan required all vessels flying the flag of 
the countries participating in the Committee to stop at any of twelve 
designated ports outside of Spain and embark two observation officials.
The duties of these officials included ascertaining as to whether or net
2kembargoed goods were aboard the ships bound for Spain.
Complementing the land and merchant vessel observation schemes was 
the naval patrol. Its members were Britain, France, Italy and Germany. 
Ships under the specific authority of their respective states patrolled 
the Spanish coasts from a distance of ten miles. Patrol zones were 
established in such a manner as to have German and Italian ships patrolling 
the coasts held by the Loyalists and the French and British ships patrol­
ling the coasts held by the Rebels.
To finance the control scheme, the Committee created an internati: nsl_ 
fund subscribed to by all the members of the Committee. The International 
Board administered the fund through an accounting officer appointed by
^^Padelford, T7-79'
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the Non-Intervention Committee.
The main failure of the scheme was that the control authorities could 
not stop the flow of contraband and volunteers into Spain 'but could 
only warn the violators of the national measures of each country against 
such actions. The only way a violator could be punished was to have the 
observation officials submit a report to the International Board describing 
the violation. The International Board would then submit the report to 
the Committee^ which would communicate the charges to the proper govern­
ment. The government of the individual who caused the violation would 
prosecute the violator in accordance with the laws of that state. The 
government would then report the actions it had taken to the Committee.
This was a long and complicated process that, in the final analysis, 
depended upon the goodwill of the government involved and its ability 
to verify the facts of the violation.
The embargo on war materials and volunteers did not include either 
Spanish combatants or states that were not signatories to the non-inter­
vention agreements. Ships flying the flags of these states were not 
required to embark observers or comply with the regulations of the naval 
patrol•
On April 7, 1937, the observation and control system went into effect. 
Because of the numerous methods of circumventing the system, both Spanish 
combatants continued to receive foreign assistance. Germany and Italy 
continued their aid to Franco in an attempt to strengthen his forces 
for the final attack against Madrid. They were convinced that enough aid
^^Padelford, 77-79-
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had reached Franco to enable him to overcome the Loyalist forces. They 
could; therefore, subscribe to the observation and control plan without 
endangering the rebel military position.
The next major problem confronting the Non-Intervention Committee 
was the question of withdrawing volunteers already in Spain. The question 
was previously brought up by Germany during the negotiations of 1936 
concerning the embargo act and the ban on volunteers. Now, however, the 
British brought up the question during the March 1, 1937 meeting of the 
Committee. Previously, Britain and France had ignored the German proposal. 
Now, it was the turn of the German and Italian representatives to evade 
and delay the question. Because of the Italian defeat at the hands of 
the Loyalist forces in the battle of Guadalajara, Italy would not con­
sider the question of withdrawing volunteers until it restored its 
military prestige.
Another factor influencing Germany and Italy to follow obstructionist 
tactics was that in the spring of 1937 Franco was in the midst of his 
campaign to conquer the northern provinces of Spain and needed the German 
air power of the Condor Legion and the Italian troops. This was especially 
true since the majority of the Rebel forces was concentrated around Madrid.
From March to May of 1937, German and Italian delaying tactics 
effectively blocked diplomatic negotiations concerning the withdrawal 
of volunteers. On March 20, Neurath informed Sir Nevile Henderson that 
Germany would proceed with discussions on volunteers only if the question 
of the Spanish gold being shipped to Russia would also be d i s c u s s e d .
25GFD., 254.
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Late in March, the German ambassador to Great Britain, Ribbentrop,
informed the German Foreign Ministry that if the Rebels could not win
without foreign assistance, gaps could be found in the observation system
in order to reinforce Franco. Ribbentrop believed that France would do
nothing without the backing of Britain, and Britain was too preoccupied
with peace and containment to force a showdown over the violation of the
26supervision and control plan.
On May 17; the British asked Germany if it would be willing to
participate in approaching both parties in Spain with the view of
reaching an agreement to an armistice in order to withdraw the foreign 
27volunteers. The German reply suggested that the question of withdrawal 
would perhaps have a better chance of success if pursued in the London 
committee. It appeared to Germany that the success of a mediation plan
28was highly unlikely.
The Deutschland incident abruptly interrupted attempts to achieve 
agreement over the withdrawal of volunteers. On May 29, 1937, the 
German 'pocket' battleship Deutschland was bombed by Loyalist aircraft
29while it lay at anchor in the harbor of Iviza. The battleship was a 
participant in the naval patrol, but at the time of the attack, it was 
off-duty. The crew suffered twenty killed and seventy-three wounded. 
Berlin sent immediate instructions to the German Embassy in Great Britain 
to the effect that, "the Reich Government will hence forth not participate
GFD., 292.
^^Ibid., 290.
^^Ibid., 292.
29Iviza is one of the Balearic Islands
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in the patrol or In the deliberations of the Non-Intervention Committee 
until it obtains a positive guarantee against a repetition of such 
incidents.Shortly thereafter, the German navy, in :retaliation shelled 
the Spanish port city of Almeria.
In reply to British fears that the German bombardment of Almeria 
might lead to an expansion of the.Civil War, Neurath stated that that 
would depend upon Britain, but as far as Germany was concerned the 
Almeria incident was the extent of German retaliation.
Now that Germany and Italy had withdrawn from the naval patrol, 
one-half of the system of supervision and control was in danger of 
collapsing. In order to meet this emergency, the British and French 
governments, with the approval of the Soviet Union, proposed that they 
take over the patrol duties in the vacated German and Italian zones. 
Germany and Italy refused to accept this offer and in return suggested 
that the naval patrol be dispensed with altogether by granting belligerent 
rights to both Spanish parties. The Axis considered the impartiality of 
the British and French in the naval patrol as questionable.
Since 1936, the German and Italian governments continually had 
attempted to persuade the other powers to recognize a state of belliger­
ency in Spain. With the status of belligerents, both parties in Spain 
would have the right to establish blockades. This would make the Linden 
committee and the embargo agreements unnecessary. Although used by 
Germany as a delaying and obstructionist tactic, the granting of 
belligerency did have some validity in international law. The recognition
^°GFD., III, 297.
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of belligerency implied a position of neutrality by the recognizing 
state. Therefore, if the powers of Europe extended belligerent rights 
to the Spanish parties, this would be the same as declaring a position 
of neutrality and as such would supercede the London committee. But a 
state was not required to extend belligerent rights automatically as 
soon as an insurgent reached a definite position in relation to the 
established government. The extension of belligerency laid solely in 
the hands of the individual states and could therefore be used as an 
instrument of foreign policy. The British were not about to extend 
belligerent rights to the Rebels,because this would give legal sanction 
to interference with foreign shipping on the high seas. In British 
opinion, this could only lead to a widening of the war and the danger 
of starting a European conflict.
By mid-summer of 1937, Franco was, with Italian assistance,
exercising belligerent rights in the Mediterranean. The naval patrol
broke down with the withdrawal of Germany and Italy. The system of
land control was also threatened as Portugal suspended frontier control
31and the French announced they would do likewise.
In an effort to insure the safety of foreign warships participating 
in the naval patrol and to bring Germany and Italy back into the com­
mittee, the British government on June 3 proposed a series of guarantees 
to the German Foreign Ministry for its approval. The guarantees included 
a pledge to be given by both Spanish parties to respect foreign warships
^^Esch., 87.
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and to designate safety zones in Spanish ports for fueling bases fcr 
patrol vessels. Failure to Implement these assurances or interference 
with patrol ships by the Spanish combatants would be the subject of 
consultation between the four naval patrol powers.
In the ensuing talks between Britain and Germany^ it was agreed cn 
June 12 that in case consultation failed Germany would retain her free­
dom of action in inflicting reprisals for unwarranted attacks upon any 
of her patrol vessels. Germany accepted the other three parts of the 
British proposal. It was also decided that Germany and Italy would re­
turn to the Committee and to the naval patrol after joint communication 
of the agreement to the Spanish parties. Without waiting for a reply,
Germany and Italy resumed on June 16 their membership in the patrol
32
scheme and the Committee. On June 17, the Spanish ambassador informed
the German Foreign Ministry that Franco intended to give his approval
to the guarantee for naval patrol vessels in Spanish ports.
Four days after the settlement of the Deutschland incident on June 15 
n  33and 18 the German cruiser Leipzig was allegedly attacked by a submarine.,'"
On the same day, the British ambassador to Germany received nctificati. n 
from the German Foreign Ministry of the cancelation of Weurath*s impending 
trip to London. The German excuse was that the attacks of German war­
ships in the Mediterranean necessitated the Foreign Minister's presence 
in Berlin. In the meantime, Germany demanded action by the f ur naval 
patrol powers under the June 12 agreement to consult in the event . f am "t,-r
^^GFD., 326-3 2 7. 
^^Esch, 82.
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attack on a naval patrol vessel. The German government was anxious to 
come to an immediate understanding as to the joint measures to be taken 
in retaliation to the attack.
At first the German proposals included an immediate naval demon­
stration by the four powers off the Loyalist coast, surrender of a,11
submarines, and a warning to the Loyalist government that further attacks
34
would be dealt with by military reprisals. Because of the British and 
French rejection of any retalitory measures until an inquiry could be 
made, Germany modified its demands to include only the naval demonstration. 
By June 23, no agreement was reached in the Four Power Conference. There­
fore in accordance with the agreement of June 12, Germany notified the 
control powers of its decision to recover freedom of action and tv. with­
draw from the naval patrol. Germany would, however, continue its parti­
cipation in the Committee. German and Italian withdrawal from the naval 
patrol limited the patrol's authority and efficiency to such an extent 
that throughout the summer of 1937 incidents of piracy increased in the 
Mediterranean. This had the effect of forcing the British and French 
governments to take action.
On September l4, the states having interests in the Mediterranean 
met at Fyon, Switzerland and agreed upon an anti-piracy contre! plan. 
Germany and Italy were invited but did not attend. The purpose of the 
Nyon agreement was to eliminate attacks on merchant and war vessels 
operating in the Mediterranean. Because of the Nyon agreement,, which 
was similar to the functions of the naval patrol, Britain and France
34GFD., 356-357.
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withdrew from the patrol in September. The naval patrol was only one 
facet of the control scheme. The remaining merchant vessel observation 
scheme continued to operate throughout the civil war, but with less 
efficiency.
During the Deutschland and Leipzig incidents the British government 
continued to press for an agreement on the withdrawal of foreign volun­
teers from Spain. The Fascist states continued to follow obstructionist 
tactics. In the June 22 meeting of the Committee, the British repres­
entative proposed that Britain be empowered to negotiate with both 
Spanish parties in order to reach an agreement on the equal withdrawal 
of volunteers from both sides. The Soviet Union defeated this proposal 
by demanding that a porportlonate withdrawal from both sides take place.35 
Germany and Italy followed similar tactics in respect to the with­
drawal question. Both avoided taking a stand on withdrawal by stating 
that the decision to withdraw volunteers must be left up to the Spanish 
governments. The German representative in the Committee was instructed 
by the Foreign Ministry to follow the lead of the Italian representative 
in obstructing withdrawal. The tactical problem confronting Germany 
and Italy was how to delay passage of a withdrawal agreement while 
placing the responsibility somewhere else.
July France was considering the advantages of reopening the 
Pyrenean frontier in order to aid the Spanish Loyalists but was restrained
35
GED., 362-364.
36 German policy was to let the Italian representative take the lead, 
thus assuring against the possibility that Germany might be blamed f r 
obstructing the progress of withdrawal.
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by Britain. The British attitude was at this time disposed towards the 
concluding of some sort of plan for the withdrawal of volunteers, and
37
the opening of the Erench-Spanish border would destroy these efforts. 
Because of Franco's northern campaign, the Loyalists badly needed the 
aid that France could give them if the Pyrenean border was reopened.
Despite British pressure, both France and Portugal withdrew the 
international observers from their borders. The only part of the ob­
servation scheme that remained was the merchant vessel system which 
required all ships bound for Spanish ports to embark neutral observers.
In order to remedy this situation, the British government introduced 
on July l4 a compromise plan in the London committee. This plan included: 
1) retention of placing neutral observers aboard ships going to Spain 
and restoration of control of land frontiers, 2) replacement of the naval 
patrol by neutral observers in Spanish ports and in Spanish airdromes,
3) withdrawal of volunteers and a commission to be sent to Spain to 
arrange and supervise the withdrawal, and 7) recognition of the bel­
ligerency of both parties when withdrawal was substantially underway and 
on the condition that both parties: a) recognize as contraband only
those articles whose shipment was prohibited under the non-intervention 
agreement and any others that might be designated by the Committee and 
b) agree not to molest ships carrying neutral observers or to interfere
38with neutral shipping not engaged in traffic with Spain. On the same 
day the committee authorized the British government to discuss points
3?GFD., 396.
^^GFD., 717-717.
one, two and three with the Spanish parties.
During the remaining months of 1937, the London committee concerned 
itself with the efforts to negotiate the terms of the British compromise 
plan and to arrive at a solution. In response to the British plan, the 
German Foreign Ministry instructed its Committee representative to 
accept the British proposal as a basis for discussion, but German policy 
was to remain vague and general. The German representative was not to 
give the impression that Germany would accept the withdrawal of volunteers
39prior to the granting of beligerent rights.
German stratigy throughout these discussions over the British plan 
was to delay and obstruct any agreement until Franco had sufficiently 
built up his forces for the planned spring offensive on the Aragon front. 
Germany was sure that the blame for delaying the withdrawal could be 
placed on the Russians.
The Non-Intervention Committee, while debating the British proposal, 
received the Dalm-Hemming report on means for restoring and improving the 
control system. The report recommended that the naval patrol remain 
dissolved and that a system of observers be placed in various Spanish 
p o r t s . A month later, on October 2, the Soviet Union took the position 
that the entire supervision and control system would be meaningless without 
the naval patrol. Any further participating in the Committee cn its part 
was conditional on the existence of an effective control system.
3^GFD., 420.
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Inability to reach an agreement over the British plan centered 
around the three points of symbolic withdrawal^ belligerent rights and 
the attitude of the Soviet Union. Germany and Italy used all three in 
order to avoid being blamed for obstructing the progress of withdrawal.
In the October 17 session of the Committee, the French representative 
introduced a plan somewhat similar to the British proposal. This plan 
was also defeated by the German use of the Soviet Union's attitude.
It was Germany's tactic to insist that the Soviet Union participate 
in any withdrawal plan by demanding that any agreement must be unanimous. 
In this way, Germany would not be blamed for delaying the progress of 
the Committee.
The German position on the three points under discussion in the 
Committee wp,s revealed in the October l8 instructions to the German 
ambassador to Great Britain. Germany favored symbolic withdrawal of a 
limited number of volunteers on an equal basis from each side. The bar­
gaining number could start at 3,000 men, but the type of volunteers 
withdrawn must be left up to the Spanish parties. Symbolic withdrawal 
was interpreted as being only an experiment. If it proved successful, 
then a larger number of volunteers could be withdrawn after a limited 
amount of debate. There was no German objection to the renewal of the 
non-intervention pledges as proposed in the French plan. The instructions
further stated that once symbolic withdrawal was concluded, the problem
k-2of belligerency must be given priority. Thus Germany reversed its 
previous stand that belligerent rights must be granted prior to any
iiPGFD., 765.
withdrawal. Both positions were tentative and could be changed or 
altered according to the tactical position that Germany wanted or needed 
to assume.
Progress in the Committee was now blocked by the disagreement over
which of the withdrawal plans, the British or the French, should be
I3discussed first. Italy, with reluctant German support, favored dis­
cussing the British plan first. The Soviet Union regarded the policy 
of non-intervention as a failure and rejected any responsibility .for 
its continuation. This was precisely what Germany and Italy wanted in 
order to shoulder Russia with the major responsibility for any failure 
of withdrawal.
In the October 22 session of the Committee, a joint draft of the 
British and French withdrawal plans was introduced. At the same session 
all the states, except France and Russia, favored setting the tentative 
number for symbolic withdrawal at 1,000. Difficulties arose over the 
date of restoration of control measures and whether the commissions 
or the Committee would decide on the definite number of volunteers to 
be withdrawn.
Germany was not as yet ready to agree to a definite plan on the 
withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain. Nor was it interested in 
having non-intervention fail. As far as Germany was concerned, a further 
gain of time would probably result in the improvement of Franco's military 
position, and this in turn would create an advantageous situation for
43Germany thought that a more conciliatory stand should be taken, 
so as not to incur any responsibility for delay.
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Germany in the Committee. With this in mind, Germany was ready to support 
symbolic withdrawal on the condition that belligerent rights be granted
kk
as soon as this partial withdrawal was completed. This was a tactical 
measure intended to cause delay, since the French demanded that bel­
ligerency be accorded only after all volunteers had withdrew from 
Spain.
Now that Germany and Italy accepted the British-French compromise 
plan in principle, the technical difficulties and minor points needed to 
be clarified. Also some sort of agreement was necessary on what the 
Russian responsibility would be if it did not agree to the withdrawal 
but remained in the Committee. Germany was not willing to force a failure 
of the British plan over Russian non-participation. In order to eliminate 
the possibility of assuming the blame of any such failure, Germany 
dropped her demand that all powers participate in the withdrawal and 
the recognition of belligerency. In its place was the new demand that 
safeguards for the Russian non-participation be included in any with­
drawal plan.
On November 4, 1937, the Committee adopted a resolution accepting 
a compromise solution based upon the July l4 British plan. The chairman 
of the Committee, Lord Plymouth, was authorized to present the plan to 
both Spanish parties in order to secure their approval. The plan con­
tained provisions to send two commissions to Spain with authority to 
estimate the total number of foreigners to be withdrawn and to make 
arrangements for their evacuation. Control measures were to be .
44
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re-established and strengthened just before the commencement of the 
evacuation process. Belligerent rights were to be granted only after
45a substantial number of volunteers had been withdrawn. The draft 
proposal also provided that safety measures would be taken to fill the 
gap caused by the Russian non-participation.
The London committee continued to work out the composition and 
powers of the commissions to be sent to Spain while awaiting the replies 
of the Spanish parties. In the meantime,the German government urged 
Franco to respond favorably to the Committee's plan,but to impose
46certain conditions. Franco agreed to do so.
The Committee received the Spanish replies by the middle of December. 
While both parties accepted the plan in principle, they made many 
conditions and expressed important reservations as to its practical 
application.
In the Committee, negotiations continued to be bogged down over the 
problem of the composition and powers of the two commissions. Other 
points of disagreement and inability to compromise were the questions 
involving substantial withdrawal and belligerent rights.
As the year 1937 came to a close, the Committee was still negotiating 
the details of the withdrawal plan which was accepted in principle by 
the participating states and the Spanish parties. Important points had 
yet to be agreed upon, and it would take months of negotiation before 
any compromise could be reached.
45I.e. deWilde, "Struggle Over Spain," Foreign Policy Reports, XIV 
(New York, 1938), 22-23.
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While the Committee continued its discussions, Franco prepared his 
forces for the spring offensive. He continued to receive large shipments 
of material and troops from Germany and Italy. Russia also continued its 
aid to the Loyalist forces. The Committee had been in existence for one 
and one-half years and its successes, besides helping to localize the 
Spanish conflict, were negligible.
At the start of the new year there was still no agreement on the 
actual number of volunteers that would constitute the "substantial with­
drawal" upon which depended the granting of belligerent rights. Franco 
was of the opinion that belligerent rights should be granted after 3,000 
men were withdrawn equally from both sides. This was the position taken 
by the German representative after Germany and Italy conferred on January 
l8< over the common policy to be adopted in the Committee concerning the 
withdrawal question.
Proportionate withdrawal from both sides was also being discussed 
in the Committee. On January 11, 1938, the Committee authorized Lord 
Plymouth to enter into private and informal talks with the representatives 
of the major powers in order to arrive at a compromise solution.
On January 20, the German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain sent 
a telegram to Berlin outlining the dilatory policy that Germany had 
followed during the previous year. Woermann included in his report a 
brief résumé of German-Italian cooperation in the Committee. The co­
operation of the two countries presented a united front unchallenged 
by any other similar group. According to Woermann, the Soviet Union 
had isolated itself because of its inability to cooperate with Britain 
or France. By introducing the question of belligerent rights, Germany
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had held up the progress of the Committee indefinitely without assuming 
the responsibility for the delay. Woermann predicted that the date for 
the implementation of the withdrawal plan would be sometime after May
4Tbut that Franco still had it in his power to cause further postponement.
In January, the Rebel military forces suffered a setback when the
Loyalists won the battle of Teruel. The German Foreign Ministry notified
its embassy in Britain to use obstructionist tactics in order to delay
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further agreement on withdrawal. In the meantime, German and Italy 
further assisted Franco in building up his forces to counteract the 
present Loyalist military advantage. This increase of foreign troops in 
Spain jeopardized the German position in the Committee. In order to give 
at least a semblance of cooperation, Woermann suggested to Berlin that 
Germany agree to the British proposal for placing observers in Spanish 
ports.
The German War ministry disliked the British plan for control officers 
in Spanish ports but agreed not to oppose it. Their opinion was that the 
naval patrol interfered with German aid to Franco. The Foreign Ministry 
reassured them that supplied could still reach Spain on ships flying 
the flags of countries not represented in the Committee or on ships flying 
either of the Spanish flags.
The renewal of submarine attacks in the Mediterranean forced Britain, 
France and I t a l y t o  increase supplementary safety measures to those
, 562. 
^^Ibid., 572.
Although Italy was not an original signatory to the Nyon agree­
ments, later she did agree tc participate in the anti-piracy measures.
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agreed upon during the Wyon Conference. These measures provided that 
submarines submerged in the patrol areas of the Mediterranean would be 
attacked. On February 8̂  the German government protested the British 
action as being a. unilateral declaration without binding legal force. 
Since the German naval forces were not affected, Germany took no further 
action.50
Agreement was finally reached In the Committee on the question of 
how many volunteers would be withdrawn before granting belligerent 
rights. All the members, except the Soviet Union, agreed upon the 
figure of 10,000. The Soviet representative demanded 20,000 as a basic 
number. This Soviet attitude stalled the progress of the withdrawal plan 
and enabled Germany and Italy to not only blame Russia for the delay 
but also to continue assisting the Spanish Rebels.
Again the question arose as to when the control system, suspended 
since July of 1937, would be restored. Germany and Italy wanted It 
restored as soon as the commissions arrived In Spain. France demanded 
restoration only after the beginning of actual evacuation.
The military situation in Spain, In March of 1938, placed the 
London committee In a somewhat awkward position. The Rebel forces 
under General Franco had recaptured Teruel and were driving towards the 
Mediterranean coast in an effort to divide the Loyalist territory In 
half. The Committee was now faced with the possibility of an early 
Franco victory. If this oceured, neither the withdrawal plan nor the
^OçFD., 582.
Committee itself would be necessary.51
Germany had no fear that the Condor Legion in Spain would be 
included in the withdrawal, since a Franco victory would eliminate the 
need for implementing the withdrawal plan. If unforeseen events pro­
longed the Rebel victory, Germany could count on Franco to reject the 
withdrawal plan or at least to make conditions that would delay its 
implementation. Therefore, on June 17 Germany informed the Committee 
that it would accept the British plan in its entirety.
The British compromise plan was to go into effect 4-5 days after its 
acceptance by the two Spanish parties. It was to be completed in approxi­
mately ll8 days. Belligerent rights would be granted as soon as 11,000 
volunteers were evacuated from the side with the smaller number of foreign 
volunteers. The control system of 1937 would be re-established--minus 
the naval patrol. In place of the patrol, international observers were
to be placed in twelve designated Spanish ports. The agreements of 1936
52and 1937 were also to be re-affirmed by the members of the Committee.
Germany and Italy, after having accepted the withdrawal plan, 
immediately set out to coordinate their positions and to advise Franco 
of their intentions. In his reply to Berlin and Rome, Franco objected 
to the British plan because it involved interference with Spanish 
sovereignty and left nationalist Spain with only partial belligerent 
rights.
On August 16, the London committee received Franco's reply to the
., 639'
^^Padelford, 104.
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British plan. The Spanish Rebel government accepted the idea of 
withdrawal and that 10,000 volunteers be withdrawn but refused to accept 
the idea of proportionate withdrawal. Franco demanded that belligerent 
rights be granted prior to the withdrawal and objected that observers 
in Spanish ports constituted a limitation on Spanish sovereignty.
Germany believed Franco's reply to be perhaps a little too negative and 
would probably cause considerable difficulty in the Committee.^3
Faced with the negative Spanish replies, the Committee did not 
convene to consider the Spanish objections to the British plan. To do 
this would have involved more months of detailed discussions before any 
agreement could be reached. Besides that, any future compromise plan had 
no greater certainty of success than the recently defeated plan. By 
this time the Czechoslovak-German crisis surpassed the Spanish affair in 
importance. Because of this new crisis, there was no serious effort 
to overcome the Spanish objections.
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On September 21, 1938, Premier Negrin of the Spanish Loyalist 
government appealed to the League of Nations to appoint a commission to 
oversee the implementation of the Loyalist's decision to withdraw all 
foreign volunteers. By October, all foreign volunteers fighting for the 
Loyalist's cause were withdrawn. Fearing that he would be held res­
ponsible for obstructing a withdrawal. Franco on October 15 allowed the 
departure of 10,000 Italian troops from Rebel territory.Franco thought
^^GFD., 730,
^^Juan Lopez Negrin. (1889-1956). Prime minister of Spain, 1937-1939- 
55padelford, 114-115-
that this would being about the recognition of his status of belligerency 
by the European powers.
In the meantime, Eranco, during an interview in Burgos, informed
the Secretary of the Non-Intervention Committee, Francis Hemming, that
"the Spanish Government put no value whatsoever on a continuation of
the sessions of the Non-Intervention. . . ."56 Hemming returned to
London on November l4 and reported that the withdrawal plan in its present
form had no chance of success. A new plan could only succeed only if
57Franco was granted belligerent rights from the very start.
In December of 1938, the Committee was in danger of becoming dis­
solved. The system of supervision and control of embargoed goods to 
Spain had been suspended and efforts to re-establish the control system 
and to effect the withdrawal of foreign volunteers had been rejected by 
the Spaniards. To all extents and purposes, there was nothing further 
for the Committee to do unless it was willing to tolerate many more 
months of prolonged discussions and disagreements.
Germany however was not willing to let the Committee dissolve.
It provided a convenient base for Germany's diplomatic support of Franco 
and also preoccupied French and British foreign policy. To keep the 
Committee alive, Germany demanded that belligerency be granted to Franco 
and that the Committee continue to work on a withdrawal plan acceptable 
to both Spanish parties.
, 780. 
57lbid., 794.
Because of the rapid progress of Franco's military forces in 
1939,^^ the member states of the Committee concentrated not so much 
upon inducing Franco to part with his foreign troops but upon the 
question of whether those volunteers would leave Spain as soon as the 
civil war was over. In this respect the British government was satisfied 
by Hitler's Munich statement and Mussolini's assurances in connection 
with the 1938 Anglo-Italian agreement. The French were not so easily 
/ persuaded. They demanded a guarantee from Franco that his future
foreign policy would not be anti-French. In the spring of 1939, Franco 
assured the French that Spain would not follow a policy hostile to France.
Neither the Non-Intervention Committee nor its sub-committee had 
held any formal sessions since July of 1938 when the British plan for 
withdrawal of volunteers had been accepted in principle. Thereafter, 
the discussions on the details of the plan had been conducted through 
private interviews between the Committee members and the chairman. 
Although the activities of the Committee had been suspended throughout 
the latter phases of the civil war, the Committee did not dissolve 
itself until April 20, 1939— one month after the Rebel occupation of 
Madrid.
Germany did not officially withdraw from the Committee until April 
20 but announced at the end of March that it would not continue making 
payments towards the cost of the control system.
Throughout its entire existence, the London Non-Intervention Com­
mittee succeeded in focusing international attention upon the Spanish
^^Franco's forces had reached the coast and were advancing on
Barcelona.
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Civil War. This was contrary to its avowed purpose of limiting the 
influence and affect of the civil war on international relations. Its 
declared purpose of prohibiting the exportation of war materials and 
volunteers to Spain was only an excuse to cover up its real intention of 
attempting to prevent the danger of the civil war becoming a European 
conflict. Thus the Committee was willing to overlook repeated violations 
of the non-intervention agreements by Germany and Italy^ if these 
violations did not endanger the efforts to localize the civil war. The 
Committee was successful in localizing the conflict, but in order to do 
so it compromised its authority and efficiency.
The Committee itself had no legal justification for its existence 
other than the national legislation of the member states implementing the 
obligations assumed in agreeing to follow a policy of non-intervention.
In other words, the effectiveness of the Committee depended on the good­
will of its members in following a specific course of action for an 
unlimited amount of time.
Any violation of the non-intervention agreements was not contrary 
to international law since the agreements did not have the same legal 
authority as a treaty or formal international agreement. However, such 
an organization as the Non-Intervention Committee could compel a 
government to comply, at least publicly, to various agreements. If a 
government was unwilling to do so, it ran the risk of incurring public 
disapproval.
Germany was well aware of the risks it ran in following obstruction­
ist tactics in the Committee and in violating the non-intervention 
agreements. This was the reason why so much emphasis was placed upon
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the attempts to shoulder the Soviet Union with the responsibility of 
delaying the progress of the Committee. Germany was following a double 
policy of publicly cooperating with the policy of non-intervention while 
privately sending assistance to the Spanish Rebels.
As far as Germany was concerned, the Committee provided a splendid 
opportunity to prolong the civil war by aiding the Rebels and to tie 
down the British and French foreign offices, it then could exercise 
less diplomatic restraint in central Europe.
CHAPTER III
GERMAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
WITH NATIONALIST SPAIN
1936-1939
Since the advent of industrialization in Spain in the early 
twentiety century, a major part of the Spanish economy has been con­
trolled by foreign capital. Although Spain was not in need of capital, 
it did need the technical knowledge necessary to exploit its vast mineral 
resources. In many respects, Spanish industrial development by 1936 
was simply a branch of the advanced industrialization of western Europe. 
"Spanish capitalism was in a significant measure but European capitalism 
in Spain.
Spanish mineral deposits so attractive to foreign capitalists 
included copper, silver, pyrites, bauxite and potassium. Seventy per­
cent of the world's mercury supply was mined in Spain, and Basque iron 
and coal deposits also contributed to the mineral wealth of Spain. To 
many people, foreign control of important Spanish mining and industrial 
enterprises was a matter of considerable importance. This was especially 
true in the case of the British, who owned and operated the Rio Tinto 
mines, Spain's largest copper deposit.
With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July, 1936, many 
countries with large investments in Spanish industry became vitally
1Puzzo, IT.
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concerned over the future of those investments. On the other hand, states 
with little or no investments in Spain looked upon the civil war as an 
opportunity to acquire certain raw materials necessary for the production 
of armaments. Acquisition could be accomplished by providing one or the 
other of the Spanish combatants with war material and demanding in return 
the export of certain vital raw materials. The availability of Spanish 
ores was assured by the need of each Spanish combatant for arms, ammuni­
tion, planes, tanks, technicians and troops.
Their initial success placed the Rebels in control of the mines of 
Huelva and Spanish Morocco, the agricultural produce of the Canary Islands 
and the abundant crops of Andalusia. The campaign of 1937 brought to 
Rebel control the Vizcayan iron ore deposits and heavy industry and 
the coal fields of Asturias. Being thus able to control much of Spain's 
mineral resources was a great advantage to the Rebels, since the export 
of mineral and agricultural raw materials became one of the major ways 
of financing the war. In addition to the export of wine, cork, oil, 
minerals and other products, the Rebels financed their war effort through 
private contributions, forced conversions of foreign securities into 
bonds, and credits. By January 1937, fTve months after the start of 
the civil war, the Rebel government owed a debt of l80 million dollars. 
Most of the debt was for war material imported from Germany. In return, 
the Nationalists shipped large quantities of iron ore and other raw 
materials to Germany under various barter and credit arrangements.
Sept. 6, 1937, 18-19.
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To handle the German . aid program to Spain and the Spanish exports
to Germany in payment for the deliveries of war material, two holding
companies were established in July 1936 under the direct supervision of
Hermann Goering. Rowak, Rohstoffe-und-Waren-Einkaufsgesellschaft, was
the German holding company which handled all purchases of war material
destined for Spain and all imports of Spanish raw material into Germany.
As Co-ordinator for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange, Goering was in
3direct control of Rowak. Working under Goering was Major von Jagwitz,
chief of the Auslandsorganisation^ s foreign office, who was later to
kbecome State Secretary in the Economics Ministry. To operate the 
machinery of the German aid program, the entire foreign office of the 
Auslandsorganisation was at Goering's disposal.
Hisma, Compania Hispano de Marroqui de Transportes, managed the 
necessary commerical transactions such as procurement and supply at the 
Spanish end of the German operation. Johannes Bernhardt, formerly a 
clerk for the Wilmer Brothers Company, a German export firm in Spanish 
Morocco, was named director of Hisma. Bernhardt had married Fraulein 
Wilmer and settled down as manager of the Wilmer Brothers branch office 
in Tetuan, where he had cultivated the friendship of Spanish officers 
stationed there. When the civil war broke out, he was thus in an 
opportune position to act as an intermediary between the Spanish Rebels 
and the Nazi party and to garner a large personal fortune as director of
3Friedrich Bethke was the administrative director of Rowak and 
departmental head in the Economics Ministry.
ilGFD., 111.
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Hisma.^ As early as August 2, Hisma ferried Rebel troops across the 
Straits from Morocco to Spain and was soon active in the Spanish economy. 
By 1937; Bernhardt’s interests Included several companies operating in 
Spain besides Hisma, grouped under a new holding company, Solflndus, 
Sociedad Financiera Industrial
Penetration of the Spanish economy by German capital was an important 
consideration in the determination of German policy towards Spain.
Hitler, in a speech at Wurzburg on June 27, 1937; stated that the reason
for German intervention in Spain was the need to acquire Spanish iron
rore. Germany also needed mercury, zinc, and copper for its rearmament 
program. These raw materials would be readily available if there was a 
Fascist regime in Spain, and thus German economic officials preoccupied 
themselves with arranging various commercial agreements, trade conces­
sions and treaties with Nationalist Spain throughout the civil war.
From 1937 to 1938, German exports to Spain increased by 46 million
Reichmarks, while imports totaled approximately 10 million Reichsmarks 
8monthly. The imports included 25, 5°3 tons of copper and 13,167 tons 
9of zinc. German efforts to acquire economic concessions from the 
Spanish Nationalists throughout the civil war finally paid off in 1939 
when the Franco government granted mining concessions to Germany.
^Puzzo, 58-5 9- 
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The basic economic policy towards Spain that Germany followed through­
out the civil war was first sketched in a report from Spain by Eberhard 
Messerschmldt, representative of the German Export Cartel for War materials. 
After touring Spain for two weeks in the autumn of 1936 interviewing major 
German officials, including Bernhardt, and inspecting the operational 
facilities of Hisma, Messerschmidt reported to Berlin that the delivery 
of German war materials to the Rebels was a Hisma monopoly. Messerschmidt 
was especially critical of Bernhardt for not demanding compensation from
Franco for German aid. "it is obvious that Bernhardt has tailored the
„10whole organization to fit his personal pattern. It was Bernhardt
however who took the initiative in getting German aid to Franco and in
implementing the aid program. According to Messerschmidt, this had been
necessary in the first stages of the German aid program, but now it was
expedient to negotiate with the Rebels in order for Germany to receive
some return on its gifts . Messerschmidt recommended that Germany be
aware of its future interests in Spain while Franco was still dependent
upon German aid. Germany would find itself empty handed if it did not
pressure Franco for pledges concerning future German economic and
political influence in Spain. There was a need for a basic German-Spanish
treaty which would outline what raw materials Spain was to deliver to
11Germany and what German manufactured goods it must buy in return.
Because of Messerschmidt's penetrating analysis of the German aid 
program and his recommendations for future German policy in Spain, the
^°GFD., 8 5. 
^^Ibid., 84-89.
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Intelligence Department of the War Ministry found it. necessary to call 
in all copies of the report. The Messerschmidt report received additional 
confirmation on November 2k in a telegram from the German embassy at 
Seville to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. The telegram described the 
urgent necessity of devising some sort of arrangement enabling the Rebels 
to pay for German war deliveries and by which German economic interests 
would be safeguarded after the end of the civil war. There was the 
danger that Britain and France might surpass Germany in granting credits 
to Spain after the civil war if some sort of German-Spanish agreement 
was not concluded.
The Economics Ministry, having received requests from Nationalist 
Spain to send representatives for negotiations on a trade and clearing 
agreement, attempted to regularize the trade in raw materials between 
Germany and Spain. Evidently the Ministry was unaware of the existence 
of the holding companies Rowak and Hisma. The Franco government was 
probably as equally confused over the lack of coordination in Berlin.
The Spanish request was more than likely be:ause of the Rebel desire 
to solve the problem as to which German agency they should deal with 
concerning the German aid program. Since the outbreak of the civil war, 
the Rebel authorities had dealt with the Nazi party through the 
Auslandsorganisation. It was through the latter agency that Spanish 
representatives received the first German, aid. and it was through 
Bernhardt, a member of NSDAP that German aid continued to reach the 
Rebels. Now they were confronted with the officials from the Economics
^^GFD., 137-139.
Ministry. Clearly something had to be done or the entire aid program 
11would suffer.
On October 16; State Secretary Kuerner of the Four Year Plan 
briefed the Economics Ministry on the existence of Rowak and Hisma and 
the functions of the two holding companies in regulating the trade in 
raw materials between Spain and Germany. Koerner explained that Rowak 
and Hisma were limited to trade in raw materials only and that their 
authority did not extend to either the Canary nor the Balearic Islands. 
Both companies held a monopoly of purchases and sales. A German ex­
porter who wished to export goods to Spain was required to sell them to 
the German firm, Rowak. A fleet of merchant ships, protected by the 
German navy, would then deliver the goods to Spain where they were 
resold to Hisma. The goods were then marketed in Spain by the Hisma 
firm. To finance the operation, the Finance Ministry granted 3 million 
Reichsmarks of credit to Rowak. Hisma obtained similar credits from the 
Spanish Rebel government.
The Economics Ministry was surprised upon learning of the exist­
ence of the German aid program to Spain under the direction of the 
ÏÏ5DAP. Since the program was already operative, the Economics Ministry 
took no initiative of its own other than attempting to expand the 
Hisma-Rowak monopoly to commercial trade under the operation of private 
business interests. The crux of the problem was the antagonism between 
the Nazi Party and the official agencies cf the German government. This
13GFD., 10.
was particularly evident when the Spanish representatives first approached 
Germany for aid. The contacts between the Spanish Rebels and German 
officials were established through the offices of the foreign organization 
of the Nazi Party. Spanish attempts to acquire aid through normal 
diplomatic channels encountered the cautious conservatism of the German 
Foreign Ministry. Ey using the Auslandscrganisation, the Spanish were 
able to expedite matters and negotiate directly with Hitler and Goering. 
Most German officials who favored aiding the Rebels encouraged this 
indirect approach through the Party apparatus as a necessary precaution 
against any unwanted publicity.
The influence of the Auslandsorganisation in matters dealing with 
the Rebel government was due to its vast network of economic and political 
agents recruited from the large number of Germans residing in Spain.
This formula for furthering German interests was repeated in other 
countries as well as in Spain. Agents of the Auslandsorganisation worked 
independently of the German Foreign Ministry, whose embassies and 
legations abroad usually followed a more cautious policy. The Auslands­
organisation agents promoted export of foreign goods to Germany, supplied 
commercial information to Germans residing in foreign countries, obtained 
control of local raw materials, and in general locked after German for­
eign interests.
1937 was an important year for laying down the basis of German- 
Spanish economic relations along the lines cf the Messerschmidt Report. 
Various protocols and agreements between 'Germany and Spain attested to 
the German desire to establish a definite foundation for acquiring 
Spanish ore and maintaining a dominant r l.e in the economy of Spain after
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the civil war. These agreements provided an outline for future German- 
Spanish economic cooperation which eventually led to concrete agreements 
on the extent of German penetration of the Spanish economy. Delay, 
misunderstanding and fear of other foreign investors supplanting German 
economic interests, characterized the German efforts to secure a position 
of superiority in order to exploit Spanish mineral resources and invest 
in the future development of the Spanish industry.
On December 23, 1936 the Economic Policy Department of the Foreign 
Ministry instructed the German ambassador to the Rebel government to 
approach the Rebels with the view of taking up negotiations to adapt 
the March 9; 1936 German-Spanish trade agreement to meet present con­
ditions. The new treaty was to contain provisions indicating the readi­
ness of both parties to conduct trade relations with each other on a 
favorable basis as possible and to insure preference in the supply of 
goods of special interest to the two parties
The Spanish Nationalist government agreed to the proposal in a 
German-Spanish protocol on January 1, 1937 and suggested that the 
negotiations be started not later than April 1, 1937-^^ The German 
officials in Berlin, including Hitler, were interested in speeding up 
the impending negotiations for fear that imminent shipments of large 
units of the Italian army to Spain might tend to lessen German influence 
with Franco.Although Germany was willing to cooperate with Italy for
^^GFD., 1 7 9. 
^^ibid., 199-200. 
^^^bid., 2 1 9.
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the sake of closer Italo-German relations,it was not ready to sacrifice 
its economic interests in Spain. The German delegation to the economic 
talks scheduled for the last week in January was led by Geheimrat Wucher, 
an experienced negotiator from the Finance Ministry. Von Jagwitz 
represented Rowak: on the delegation.
On January 28, Bernhardt reported to the Foreign Ministry that in 
the last six months most of the German deliveries to Spain were without 
payment. The payments the Rebel government made were in goods or small 
amounts of foreign exchange. The Rebels used most of their foreign 
exchange to buy supplies from countries other than Germany. Bernhardt 
recommended that the Rebels be asked to apply all their foreign exchange 
exclusively to the purchase of German materials.
The major topic under discussion among German officials in Berlin 
from February to May, 1937, while economic negotiations continued be­
tween Germany and Spain, was whether or not the Hisma-Rowak monopoly 
of all German purchases and sales in Spain should be continued. Both 
German and Spanish export interests wanted the restoration of normal 
commercial relations. This involved substituting a clearing agreement 
in place of the Hisma monopoly. A number of other countries had already 
concluded such an agreement with the Nationalist government, and Germany 
risked the possibility of losing the Spanish market if it did not do 
the same. On the other hand, Hisma succeeded in placing Germany ahead 
of other countries in Spanish trade and directing raw materials 
primarily to Germany. The pressure needed to stop Franco from selling 
materials to other countries for foreign exchange could be applied by 
Hisma because of its great influence with the Rebels. The Foreign
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Ministry and Field Marshal Goering supported the Hisma-Rowak monopoly, 
while President Schacht of the Reiehshank and the Finance and Food 
Ministries were in favor of replacing Hisma with a clearing agreement.
By May, the German officials in charge of the aid program to Spain 
decided not to negotiate a clearing agreement with the Nationalist govern­
ment but to continue the Hisma-Rowak monopoly. General Franco was to 
be consulted for his views on a clearing agreement. If he insisted on 
such an agreement, Germany was prepared to conclude a partial clearing 
agreement but only on the condition that a guarantee be given by the
Rebels that the transactions in raw materials and essential foods be
IT
reserved for the Hisma-Rowak firms.
In the meantime, German-Spanish economic negotiations reached an
impasse over the Rebel delegation's demand for a clearing agreement to
reopen private trade relations. The Foreign Ministry instructed Stohrer
to inform Franco of the impassee and to ask for (his) position on the
matter. On May 21, Franco replied to the German representation by
stating that he did not attach any importance to a clearing agreement
at this time and that the Rebel delegation overstepped its authority
18in pushing for such an agreement.
Delays, criticisms of the Hisma monopoly, and complaints by private 
German and Spanish business interests held up the signing of the 
economic agreements. The Nationalist government informed Stohrer that 
the inadequate facilities and organizations of the Spanish agencies
. , 87-85 
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created a situation in which the negotiations involved a longer period 
of time to be concluded than was originally thought.^9
20On July 12^ 15 and l6_, protocols were signed between Jordana,
representing the Nationalist government, and Stohrer, representing the
German government. These protocols signified the successful conclusion
of the economic talks that had been going on for the past few months
between Germany and Nationalist Spain. The protocol of July 12 stated
that a more comprehensive settlement of economic relations between Spain
and Germany was postponed for the present. Spain promised to conclude
its first general trade agreement with Germany with unrestricted most-
favored- nation treatment. If Spain attempted economic negotiations with
a third party, it would inform Germany before any agreement was reached.
In the July 15 protocol, Germany and Spain agreed "to assist one another
to the greatest possible extent in the delivery of such raw materials,
foods and semifinished and finished goods as are of particular interest
21to the recipient country."" On July l6, Spain agreed to pay its debts 
to Germany in Reichsmarks at a four percent annual interest. Partial 
payment of the Nationalist debt would be by the export of certain goods 
and minerals from Spain and Spanish Morocco of vital interest to Germany. 
Also, the Nationalist government would provide funds to Germany for re­
investment in Spain. Germany received the opportunity to participate
^9GPP., hOJ.
Count Francisco Gomez Jordana. (1876-19^^ )• President of the 
Junta Técnica, 1938. Vice-President and Foreign Minister of Spanish 
Nationalist government, 1938-1939-
^^GFD., 417.
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in the future economic reconstruction of Spain,especially in mineral
22resources and other raw materials.
The July protocols were considerable economic concessions to Germany.
If the Spaniards could be taken at their word, Germany would have a
significant amount of control over the economy of Spain in the future,
Events were to prove that the Nationalist government interpreted the
July protocols in a slightly different manner than did Germany.
On October 9; the Spanish Nationalist government issued a decree
suspending for the present all transactions of and titles to mining
property. Also, all titles, leases, sales and purchases of mines or
mining property acquired after July l8, 1936 were declared null and 
23void. The decree was a setback to German businessmen in Spain who 
attempted to secure control of Spanish mines in order to guarantee a 
continuous supply of raw materials to Germany. The German businessmen 
involved, were agents of the Hisma company. Hisma activities in this,
2kfield included the Montana project, which was an attempt to bring about 
German control of five mining companies operating in Spain. On October 
12, Bernhardt protested to General Jordana and General Franco that the 
decree of October 9 adversely affected Hisma’s efforts to secure German 
participation in the Spanish mining industry. Bernhardt also complained 
that the Nationalist decree was not in the spirit of the July protocols. 
The Nationalists gave indefinite assurances that the decree was not
^^GFD., 421-422 
23ibid., 457- 
24.Montana companies: Aralar, Compania Explotadora de Minas S.A.,
Tolosa, capital stock of 25 million pesetas; Cia, Minera Santa Tecla S.A., 
Vigo, capital stock of 12 million pesetas; Montes de Galicia, Orense, 
capital stock of 16 million pesetas; Sierra de Gredos, Salamanca, capital 
stock of 8 million pesetas; Montanas del Sur, Seville, capital stock of
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directed against German interests but rather against the possibility of
the Loyalist government's granting economic concessions to foreign
interests— especially to the Soviet Union. Jordana requested that
Hisma*s views be put in writing. This was done, but Jordana was still
evasive and gave the impression that the Rebel government was not anxious
to discuss the question at this time. Neither Hisma nor the German
embassy was satisfied with the Rebel's actions, particularly since they
viewed that the decree of October 9 as directed against Germany. Stohrer
and Bernhardt considered a direct appeal to Franco in order to clarify 
25the situation.
In the meantime, the German Foreign Ministry informed Stohrer on 
October 16 that the Spanish Rebels intended to enter economic negot­
iations with Britain. Any agreement with a third party was potentially 
dangerous to German preeminence in the Spanish economy. The German-
British competition in iron ores and copper made these impending
26
negotiations all the more worth watching. Stohrer was instructed to 
keep the Foreign Ministry informed of the course of the Anglo-Spanish 
talks and to intervene to protect German interests if they seemed 
directly menaced.^7 On October 24, Stohrer replied that Nicolas Franco^^
^^GFD., 496.
^&In the summer of 1937,the Nationalist government took over con­
trol of the Rio Tinto mines and the mining facilities of Bilbao. Germany 
and Britain constantly pressured the Nationalists for mining rights in 
these two areas. The British were especially concerned with maintaining 
their controlling position in the Rio Tinto mines.
^7gFD., 461.
28Nicolas Franco: (189I- )■ Brother of General Franco, head of
General State Secretariat (political department)of the Span. Nat. gov. 
Later Ambassador to Portugal.
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29and Chef de Cabinet Sangronlz assured hlm that economic questions were 
not discussed with the British. The talks entailed only the conclusion 
of a consular agreement involving the exchange of semi-official missions 
between Nationalist Spain and Britain.
By October 1937, Spanish Nationalist debts for the delivery of German 
war goods totaled 70 million Reichsmarks. In addition to the debt for 
German deliveries, Stohrer, in a memorandum dated October 25, stated that 
the German property damage in Spain amounted to another 90 million Reichs­
marks. Stohrer went on to say that the embassy was aided by the foreign 
agencies of the NSDAP in organizing and aiding the German colony in Spain. 
So far, cooperation between official German agencies and the Nazi Party 
was very effective. Again the problem of the Hisma monopoly prompted 
Stohrer to write that Spanish opposition elements were growing and should
be carefully considered for their influence on future German-Spanish
31economic relations.
Germany's economic aims in Spain involved penetrating into the main 
sources of Spanish wealth, i.e. mining and agriculture. The Montana pro­
ject constituted the whole aim and purpose of German exploitation of 
Spanish mineral resources. If the Nationalist government did not consent 
to the German demands then Germany would apply stronger measures than 
mere negotiations in order to reap sufficient rewards for its assistance 
to the Spanish Rebels.
^José Antonio de Sangroniz Y Castro: (1895- )• Chef de Cabinet
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist government. Later 
Ambassador to France and Italy.
30gfd., 478.
3^Ibid., 480.
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Germany was also concerned over the possibility that the Rebels would 
grant economic concessions to Britain at the expense of German mining 
interests in Spain. Goering was particularly irritated on hearing rumors 
that because of the Hisma-Rowak monopoly Spanish economic interests 
contemplated opening up negotiations with the British in order to estab­
lish stronger economic relations between the two countries. To counter­
act this possibility, Goering favored sending a representative to 
Salamanca to "hold a pistol to General Franco's b r e a s t . J a g w i t z  
calmed Goering down by suggesting that the German ambassador be instructed 
to.make representations to Franco expressing deep concern over the 
security of German interests in Spain. Bernhardt, who at this time was 
in Berlin, agreed with the suggestion.
On November 27, Stohrer undertook the demarche with Franco in the 
interest of mining concessions and against Anglo-Spanish agreements 
detrimental to Germany. Stohrer also asked Franco for a binding pledge 
of protection for a list of concessions already held by H i s m a . T o  
further strengthen Hisma's bargaining power with the Nationalist govern­
ment, Goering, on November 30 appointed Bernhardt the official represent-
34ative of the Four Year Plan for economic questions in Spain.
On December k, Franco denied rumors of Spanish economic concessions
O C
Britain "as pure fabrications." He promised to consider the list of
32GFD., 508. 
Ibid, 511-
34Ibid., 516.
35ibid., 522.
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mining concessions demanded by Germany. However, Franco's assurances did 
not satisfy Berlin. On December 13, the Foreign Ministry instructed 
Stohrer to continue pressuring Franco on the subject of economic con­
c e s s i o n s . In a subsequent meeting between Bernhardt, Stohrer and Franco 
on December 20, the German representatives were told that the German 
demands needed time to be examined. There must also be a clarification 
of the judicial and legal situation. To accomplish the clarification. 
Franco proposed that a mixed commission be created to make an expert 
study of the legal situation and try to come to an understanding. The
commission would be composed of members of the Junta Técnica, Hisma and
37the German embassy.
What alarmed the Nationalist government was Germany's method of 
acquiring numerous mining rights without announcing its intentions or 
consulting the Rebels about future purchases. Jordana informed Stohrer 
that difficulties between Germany and Nationalist Spain were unnecessary 
and could be avoided if Germany would only give the Impression that it 
desired to cooperate with the Nationalist government.
Various conferences, inspections and collections of data involving 
technical and legal questions of the Montana affair were in operation 
by the second week of January between representatives of the Junta 
Técnica and the Rowak-Hisma firms. In a conference on the Montana 
project between officials of the German embassy and the Hisma company 
on January 10, 1938, "it was agreed that all materials suitable for
^^GFD..> 528. 
3?lbid., 538.
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answering any objections which the Spaniards might still raise would be
38examined and assembled at once." In the meantime, it was decided that 
undue pressure would not be exerted on the Junta since various Hisma-
39owned mines were continuing to operate with the consent of the Rebels.
German officials in Berlin were particularly anxious that the 
economic talks proceed rapidly in order to secure from General Franco 
a guarantee of mining rights in Spain. Germany was not prepared to 
accept the Nationalist's limitation of twenty-five percent foreign owner­
ship of Spanish companies. The German embassy was therefore instructed 
to watch closely further developments in Spain which might influence 
German economic interests.
The Nationalist government continued to find reasons for delaying 
the conclusion of any definite economic agreement with Germany, especially 
concerning German interests in Spanish mineral resources. Both Stohrer 
and Bernhardt attempted at every opportunity to push and expedite the 
settlement of the Montana affair but were repeatedly confronted with 
Spanish excuses for delay. In response to the continual German represen­
tations, Jordana expressed on February 10 the view that Spain was 
anxious to cement friendly and close ties with Germany in the economic 
field, but changes in government and administrative delays prevented an
4oearly settlement. German strategy involved couching its demands for
38GFD., 549.
^^On January 21, Bernhardt reported to Berlin that ore shipments 
from Spanish Morocco and Nationalist Spain to Germany during December 
1937, amounted to 205,000 tons of iron ore, 55,000 tons of pyrites and 
152 tons of tungsten, copper and bronze. Total imports of Spanish ores 
during the entire year totaled 2,584,000 tons. (GFD , 565)-
4oGFD., 586.
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economic concessions in terms of cooperation, historical ties and common
enemies, while avoiding the impression that it merely wanted economic
rights in Spain as compensation for services rendered in supplying the
Spanish Rebels with war material.
Franco finally took the initiative and on March 19 ordered the
hinewly created Council of Ministers to decide the question of German 
mining rights in Spain. The council decided to initiate studies with the 
view of replacing the October 9, 1937 law with a general decree applic­
able to all foreign powers and which allowed room for granting special 
rights to the Axis powers. However, the proposed decree would enable 
the Spanish government to grant or refuse changes of ownership in Spanish 
mines. On April 6, Stohrer protested to Franco that the proposed law was 
unwise and unjust. In its place the German ambassador recommended that 
the Nationalist government issue a general mining law which would give
Germany much more freedom of action in acquiring mining rights than the
h2decree of the Council of Ministers.
Hitler reserved for himself the decision as to the amount of financial 
claims that Germany would make on the Spanish Rebel government for the
43delivery of war materials. Originally, it was decided that the Rebels 
would pay for these supplies on a cash basis. This was not done because 
the amount of German aid exceeded the Spanish ability to pay in foreign
^^In February, 1938, the Nationalists formed a regular cabinet with 
Franco as President of the Council. Jordana was Vice-President.
42
GFD., 637.
^^Ibid., 648.
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exchange and raw materials. As of March 31, 1938, the Nationalists 
paid only 4$ million Reichsmarks of the total 338 million Reichsmarks of
44the Wehrmacht's expenditures for men and material in Spain. In partial 
payment of the debt. Franco released some 10-12 million Reichsmarks for 
reinvestment by Hisma in Spain. At the time, Hisma was demanding that 
Franco grant 90 million more in credit for the German investment in Spain.
On May 31, Stohrer was still attempting to exert influence on Franco 
and the Council of Ministers as to the final draft of the proposed decree 
that would replace the law of October 9, 1937- To support the German 
case, Stohrer recommended to the Foreign Ministery that a demarche be 
made with the Spanish ambassador in B e r l i n . ^5
The new Spanish mining law was signed on June 6, 1938, before 
Stohrer had an opportunity to discuss with Franco what form the law 
would take and to what extent German economic interests in Spain would 
be safeguarded. Jordana explained to the enraged German ambassador that 
the new law increased foreign participation in mining rights from twenty- 
five to forty percent, with the possibility of further increasing the 
percentage in special cases. Stohrer considered the law as an unfriendly 
act toward Germany. But in his report to Berlin, Stohrer was not as 
outraged as he had been with the Spanish Foreign Minister. "The result 
is by no means pleasing or gratifying, even though the new law . . .
46seems acceptable to our interests." The Spaniards seemed to act as if
^^GFD . , 648. 
^^Ibid; 667. 
^^Ibid., 675-
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the promises they made to respect German economic interests were not
entirely in good faith, since the method of passing the new law was
similar to a fait accompli. Wot only had the Rebels failed to inform
the German officials of the proceeding of the Council of Ministers,
but had denied the German Ambassador permission to see General Franco
prior to the promulgation of the new law.
Despite the Spanish method of passing the new law, the Germans
were not entirely disappointed with it. In Bernhardt's opinion, the law
offered the possibility of acquiring 100^ control of Spanish mining
interests in special cases. Because of dummy companies and personnel,
the 4o^ could be avoided. "In the final analysis we have thus probably
achieved substantially what we had to achieve from the standpoint of our
interests and what we could demand in consideration of the claims of
other countries . . . and Spain's understandable desire to safeguard
h Yher own interests." '
On October l8, the German Economics Ministry recommended to the 
Foreign Ministry that further German aid to the Spanish Rebels be con­
ditional upon prior guarantee by the Nationalist government of German 
control of the Montana companies. The next day Jordana told Stohrer 
that payments to the Montana project of sums owed to Germany were approved 
by the Nationalist government. This slight concession by the Rebels had 
the effect of paving the way for greater German control of Spanish 
mineral resources.
By this time, Berlin was becoming more and more apprehensive over
^?GFD., 687.
113
the lack of Spanish cooperation in guaranteeing the participation of 
German capital in Spanish industry. Therefore, on November 7 the Foreign 
Ministry instructed Stohrer to inform Jordana that new material to 
Nationalist Spain was conditional upon Rebel acknowledgement in precise 
figures of past deliveries of war material and expenses of German per­
sonnel and equipment incurred while in Spain. The new material was 
also conditional upon a decision by the Council of Ministers as to
whether or not it would permit more than 40% German ownership of various 
mining companies in S p a i n . T h e  reasoning behind the German move was 
that the shipments to Spain of war material and the maintenance of the 
Condor Legion caused a considerable burden on the German rearmament 
program. Germany, as a consequence, needed raw material and foreign 
exchange.
On November 19, Stohrer notified Berlin that the German conditions
were acceptable to the Nationalist government. The Spaniards were also
willing to firmly orientate themselves politically and economically
4gtoward Germany after the civil war.
Ly March 11, 1939, the approaching end of the civil war suggested 
to Germany the need to arrive at some sort of commercial treaty with 
Nationalist Spain in order to settle the Rebelt debt to Germany for 
deliveries of war material, to guaranteeofuture ore deliveries, and to 
enable Germany to play a major role in the reconstruction of the Spanish 
economy. German ambassador Stohrer advised Berlin that because of the
^^GTD.., 784.
fulfillment of the German wishes, the Nationalist government 
granted to Germany an Increase of German capital to 75^ in three of the 
five Montana mining companies, and to 60% in the other two.
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Increased competition of Britain, France and the United States negoti­
ations with the Rebels should be initiated as soon as possible. The 
Hisma-Rowak monopoly should also be reevaluated in order to conciliate 
German and Spanish private commercial interests.
The Nationalist government also desired to clarify Germany's role 
in reconstruction and future trade with Spain. On March 15, the Spanish 
Minister of Commerce suggested to Stohrer immediate discussions for the 
purpose of arranging a settlement of the outstanding German-Spanish 
economic questions. In view of reports of an imminent Loyalist surrender, 
the German Foreign Ministry accepted the Spanish offer with a sense of 
urgency. The delegation^^ named for the economic talks with Spain was to 
approach the Nationalists with a friendly and cooperative attitude and 
to avoid at all cost any impression of competing with the Italians.
Germany gave the impression publically that the Italians were partners, 
but privately they were regarded as economic competitors in Spain.
In the preliminary negotiations lasting from June 12 to July 5 in 
Burgos, the Spaniards appeared cooperative but seemed uncertain as to 
what form German-Spanish economic relations would take in the future.
The Nationalist government was prepared to negotiate the German claims
53on war debts, which now totaled 500 million Reichsmarks. The Spaniards 
also expressed a desire for a clearing agreement in place of the Hisma- 
Rowak monopoly. In repayment of the war debt, Germany expected yearly
^°GFD., 863.
5^Sabath, Counselor of Legation in Spain; Bethke, of the Economics 
Ministry; Koenning, of the Finance Ministry.
, 8 95.
^^Ibid., 892.
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Imports in the sum of 250 million Reichsmarks or more. Fifty percent 
of these imports would be specified by Germany. The Nationalists were 
also expected to provide funds for the Solfindus investments, which would
54be subtracted from the total war debt.
Despite the fact that the negotiations for a general German-Spanish
economic agreement dragged on into World War II, Germany still received
extensive compensation for its aid delivered to the Spanish Rebels
throughout the civil war. Because of its continual pressure on the
Nationalists for economic concessions during the civil war, Germany was
able by 1939j> to exert a strong influence on the future development and
direction of Spanish trade and economic reconstruction. Despite the
Nationalist's victory over the Loyalists, the Rebel government was still
unable to establish a working, sound economy without German assistance,
because of the destructiveness of the civil war. Because of the German
penetration of the Spanish economy, the Nationalists were unable to con-
\
elude extensive trade agreements with Britain, France or the United 
States in order to escape the economic grasp of Germany. Thus Germany 
received ample economic compensation for its material and technical 
support of the Rebel forces. As a consequence, traditional British- 
Spanish and French-Spanish trade declined.
Germany's political relations with Nationalist Spain were not as 
successful as its economic relations. It was not until March 1937 that
The Solfindus company with its headquarters in Salamanca, was 
mainly concerned with exporting to Germany wools, skins, ores, metal, 
agricultural products and resin products. Solfindus controlled the 
Spanish and German dealers and firms which previously arranged the 
purchase and export of the above material.
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Geriüany made any attempts to clarify its future political relations with 
Spain. At this time, the Spanish Nationalist government and Germany 
concluded a secret protocol at Salamanca. Both governments agreed to 
consult each other on measures necessary to defend themselves against 
the threat of communism. They also agreed to consult one another on 
questions concerning international policy which affected their joint 
interests. Neither party would enter into agreements directed against 
its treaty partner or assume any other position than benevolent neutrality 
if either party was attacked by a third party.
The next German attempt to bind Spain closer to the Berlin-Rome 
Axis without involving the obligations of a military alliance was on 
April 6, 1938, when Ribbentrop advised Hitler on the necessity of con­
cluding a political treaty with Spain along the lines of the protocol 
of 1937-^^ Hitler was not enthusiastic over this type of treaty and
requested that the Foreign Ministry delay approaching Franco for the 
57time being.
The Foreign Ministry delayed consideration of the treaty with the 
Spaniards until May, at which time it instructed Stohrer to sound out 
Franco as to the attitude of the Nationalist government concerning such 
a treaty. Jordana and Franco approved of the treaty but informed the 
German ambassador that they wanted it to remain a secret. The Spaniards 
feared that a German-Spanish political treaty at this time would hamper
^^GFD., 256-2 5 7. 
^^Ibid., 6 31. 
57ibid., 634.
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the British efforts for a rapproachment with Nationalist Spain, especially 
since the British were pressuring the French government to stop its aid 
to the Loyalists in an effort to create a positive atmosphere for the 
British-Spanish talks. Spanish reasons for delaying the treaty did not 
mean a rejection of the treaty but merely an effort to guard against 
unpleasant international repercussions detrimental to the Nationalist 
c a u s e . O n  May 31, 1938, the German Foreign Ministry notified Stohrer 
that a secret treaty was of no value to Germany at this time and that
59negotiations should be delayed until a more opportune moment. There
matters stood until December 1938, when Germany renewed its efforts to
conclude a German-Spanish political treaty.
By the end of February 1939, negotiations reached a successful
conclusion with Franco's approval of the text of the German-Spanish
60
Treaty of Friendship. On March 31, the treaty was signed at Burgos.
It contained approximately the same articles as Ribbentrop's April 1938 
draft treaty, with the exception that the treaty would remain in force 
for five years and if not rejected six months prior to expiration, it 
would continue for another five years.^
In the meantime, German-Spanish relations suffered a slight setback. 
During the Czech crisis of September 1938, after representations by 
Britain and France, Franco announced that in the event of war Spain would
^^GFD., 664. 
59Ibid., 660. 
^°Esch., 1 5 8. 
^^GFD , 884.
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declare its neutrality. In order to offset any possible German protests,
62
Franco intended to address a letter to Hitler on the question. On 
September 28, Woermann, Under State Secretary in the German Foreign 
Office, informed the Spanish ambassador that Germany understood the 
Spanish position but expected Nationalist Spain not to negotiate this 
question with Britain or France and also expected Spanish benevolent
63neutrality towards Germany in the event of a European conflict. The 
Nationalist government replied by stating that the initiative in the 
affair came from Britain and France.
The Spanish statement of neutrality originated from the Nationalist's 
misgivings over what effect the Munich conference would have on the 
Nationalist's cause. The Spaniards felt that during the conference 
Germany did not give enough consideration to the cause of Nationalist 
Spain. Berlin in fact maintained no contact with Franco as to German
64
political or military intentions in the event of a European war.
Germany quickly reassured the Nationalists that no decision concerning 
Spain came out of the talks between Hitler and Chamberlain and that Ger­
man units and material would remain in Spain in the event of war.
German reassurances calmed the Spanish and stimulated further attempt's 
to solidify German-Spanish political relations.
The next German effort to strengthen German-Spanish political ties 
was the attempt to secure Spanish adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.
, 7 49.
^^Ibid., 752.
^̂ Ibid., 741.
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On January k, 1939; the Foreign Ministry instructed Stohrer to discuss
65the matter with Franco. Because of the possibility of French and
British jure recognition of the Nationalist's government at the time.
Franco politely rejected the German invitation. He eventually agreed
at the end of February but on the condition that it remain a secret
66until the end of the war. The Nationalists feared that a public
announcement would jeopardize its efforts to secure the return of 
Loyalist war materials, merchant vessels, and gold from France. On 
April 7; 1939; after settlement with the French, the Nationalist govern­
ment publically announced its March I7 adherence to the Anti-Comintern 
Pact.^^
Although Germany was quite willing to apply pressure on the Franco 
government in order to conclude political agreements, it maintained an 
official policy of non-intervention in domestic Spanish affairs through­
out the civil war. The Germans felt that their interests in Spain were 
best served by not emphasizing their ideological inclination towards the 
Spanish Falange. Any attempts to transplant National Socialism to 
Spain was potentially dangerous to future German-Spanish relations.
This policy was in operation as early as November 1936, when the Foreign 
Ministry instructed Faupel, newly appointed ambassador to Nationalist 
Spain, not to interfere with the Rebel conduct of the war or to assist
^^GFD., 8l4.
^^Esch., 158.
'̂̂ Two other German-Spanish agreements were concluded during 1939; 
a cultural agreement on January 2k, and a labor exchange permit agree­
ment on January 2 9 . The ratification of the cultural agreement was 
delayed by protests from the Vatican to the Nationalist government. The 
matter was eventually allowed to lapse without ratification.
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General Franco unless requested to do so.^^
The success of the German efforts to assure closer political 
relations with Nationalists Spain was clearly evident by the summer of 
1939- Although the Nationalists were committed by the Treaty of Friend­
ship not to enter into agreements directed against Germanythey were 
not bound to any definite military or political alliance. No treaty 
or agreement existed between Spain and Germany that morgaged Spain’s 
political future. It was obvious from Franco's statements during the 
Czech crisis that Spain would remain neutral during any future European 
war. To what extent this neutrality would be favorable towards Germany 
was a questibn that only future events could decide. However, German 
political influence in Spain combined with its considerable economic 
influence created a situation in which Germany controlled to a 
considerable extent Spain's future political and economic foreign 
relations. This was evident during World War II when the predominant 
German position in Spain forced the Nationalist government to balance its 
foreign policy between neutrality, benevolent neutrality and outright 
association with the Axis powers.
Being a military officer and staunch supporter of the Spanish 
Falange, Faupel found it difficult to stay out of Spanish political 
problems and to let the Rebels conduct the war. It was partly for these 
reasons that Franco requested Faupels recall in September 1937-
CONCLUSION
After its initial decision in July 1936 to support the Spanish 
Nationalists with military assistance, Germany continued throughout 
the civil war to give the Nationalists diplomatic and military support.
Ey the summer of 1938, Germany calculated that its military assistance 
to the Rebels totaled 337 million Reichsmarks.^ This figure did not 
include the casualities among the German personnel in Spain nor the cost 
to German prestige and influence caused by the international complications 
of the German policy of publicly adhering to non-intervention while 
privately sending military aid to the Spanish Nationalists. The dis­
patch of the Condor Legion to Spain in October 1936 caused additional 
hardships on the German Luftwaffe which was in the process of an extensive 
training program at home. According to Kesselring, then Chief of the 
General Staff of the Luftwaffe, "drafts to the Spanish theatre comprised 
our very best material, to the prejudice of the training work of the 
Home Command. . . . We, at home, were accordingly faced with every kind 
of difficulty as the demand for personnel and technical equipment upset 
our training programme.
Although German intervention in Spain occurred simultaneously with 
Italian intervention and eventually became a cooperative effort, impor­
tant differences existed between the German and Italian contributions
^GFD., 648.
^Albert Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, (New York, 1954), 22. 
Hereafter cited as Kesselring.
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to the Rebel victory. While Italian military aid to the Spanish
3Nationalists was more extensive in quantity, Germany contributed 
military and technical aid far superior in quality. German military 
aid included large quantities of heavy equipment, heavy artillery, 
trained artillerists, heavy bombers, pilots, navigators, anti-aircraft 
crews, and in general the technical services necessary to wage modern 
war. At least as important was the swiftness of organization and dis­
patch of the German aid to the Rebel forces. During the months of July 
and August 1936, it was Germany, rather than Italy, that supplied the 
Rebels with sufficient material to overcome the vast and bitter resis­
tance of the Spanish people and to ferry the Rebel troops across the
kStraits of Gibraltar. Hitler later commented that "the intervention 
of the German General von Richthofen and the bombs his squadrons rained 
from the heavens . . . decided the issue.Towards  the end of World 
War II, Hitler stated that "Franco ought to erect a monument to the glory 
of the Junker 52. It is this aircraft that the Spanish revolution has 
to thank for its victory. It was a piece of luck that our aircraft 
were able to fly direct from Stuttgart to Spain.
Compensation from the Spanish Nationalist government for German 
war materials was not as extensive as Germany expected. Although there
^By March 1937, Italian troops in Spain numbered 60 to 70 thousand 
men. Bullock, 3^8-3^0-
^Puzzo, 65-6 6.
^Adolf Hitler, tr. R.H. Stevens, Hitler's Secret Conversations 
1941-194 4, (New York, 1953), 462, Hereafter cited as Conversations.
^Conversations, 558.
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were various German-Spanish agreements, protocols and treaties out­
lining in general terms future German participation in the Spanish 
economy, no definite agreements existed between the two countries by 
which the Rebels acknowledged a definite area of the Spanish economy 
available for German exploitation. This was true despite the 1939 
mining concessions granted to the German controlled Solfindus company.^ 
As late as September 1940, Franco still proved to be obstinate over 
the question of repayment of the civil war debt. He refused to mix 
what he considered idealistic questions (the Nationalist cause) with 
crass economic questions (the Nationalist debt to Germany).
Despite the difficulties of acquiring economic concessions from
the Rebels and in bringing Nationalist Spain into closer political
8
relations with the Axis powers, Germany did receive some benefits from 
its intervention in the Spanish Civil War. The Condor Legion gained 
an immense amount of combat experience during the civil war. The Ju 8T 
dive bomber excelled to such an extent that it was used as a decisive 
weapon in World War II until 194-2. Also the activities of the German 
anti-aircraft batteries in Spain gave German observers valuable 
information as to the "tactical employment and development as organized
7Throughout the civil war Nationalist Spain was shipping extensive 
amounts of ores to Germany, but this was by separate agreements per­
taining to each shipment of ore. This type of arrangement could be 
terminated at the pleasure of the Rebels. Thus German ore supplies 
from Spain were on tenuous grounds.
8
Although Spain signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939, this was 
not a formal agreement to support the cause of Fascism nor a binding 
political agreement. It merely combined Germany-Italy-Spain in a 
common cause against Communism.
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units of these batteries."^
A political advantage gained by Germany for its participation in 
the civil war was that another Fascist or dictatorial state, along the 
lines of Germany and Italy, established itself in Europe. As far as 
Germany was concerned, the more Fascist states in Europe, the greater 
would be its prestige. A Fascist government in Spain would not only 
strengthen German influence in Europe but would also surround France 
with unfriendly neighbors whose very existence might prevent effective 
French action against German manipulations in Eastern Europe.
Perhaps an even greater advantage for Germany arose out of German- 
Italian cooperation in aiding the Rebels during the civil war. This 
cooperation resulted in closer relations between Italy and Germany. It 
was Germany's policy as early as 1936 to court the Italians in an 
effort to prevent them from succumbing to British and French attempts 
to re-establish good relations with Italy after the Ethiopian affair. 
Italian interest in the Spanish conflict further embittered Italian- 
British-French relations. As a consequence, Italy gravitated towards 
Germany which held similar interests in the Spanish situation. Thus 
Chamberlain's overtures to Mussolini from 1937 to 1939 did not spcceed 
because of Italian policy in Spain. Germany let Italy contribute the 
majority of the aid to the Spanish Rebels and thereby create a cooling 
of relations between Britain, France and Italy.
In November 1937, while Italy was becoming deeply committed to the
Kesselring, 22,
10GFD., 170-173.
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Spanish cause. Hitler was telling his generals that a 100% Rebel victory 
was not desirable since a continuation of tensions in the western Medit­
erranean would lead to a further deterioration of British, French and
11
Italian relations. This could only benefit Germany. "Indeed, the
common policy of Italy and Germany towards Spain created one of the
main foundations on which the Rome-Berlin Axis was built, and the
Spanish Civil War proved much greater scope for such cooperation than
12
the Abyssinian War from which Germany had held aloof."
The Spanish Civil War provided Germany with one more occasion to 
test the mettle of Britain and France as to how far they would allow 
Germany to proceed with its adventuristic foreign policy. German and 
Italian intervention in Spain elicited only a feeble veto from the 
Western powers and in some cases outright encouragement. The British 
and French attitude convinced Hitler that he could continue his 
uncompromising attitude in foreign affairs without recourse to war.
By 1938, the Spanish Civil War slowly faded out of the inter­
national picture to be replaced by more important and pressing matters 
such as the Munich conference. World attention was more concerned with 
what Hitler was saying and doing than in what was going on in Spain.
On February 10, 19^5, Hitler commented for the last time on the Franco 
regime. "We were badly deceived, for, had I know the real state of 
affairs, I would never have allowed our aircraft to bombard and destroy
^^GFD., Series D, Vol. I, 36-37< 
^^Bullock, 348-350.
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a starving population and at the same time re-establish the Spanish
13
clergy in all their horrible privileges. Hitler, at this time, was
attempting to rationalize Germany's impending defeat and was blaming 
the Spanish Rebels for not entering the war on the Axis side. As far 
as Hitler was concerned, the Rebels obstinacy in refusing to join the 
Axis during World War II was indicative of Spanish ingratitude for 
German support during the civil war.
^^Adolf Hitler, tr. R.H. Stevens, The Testament of Adolf Hitler 
(February-April 19^3)? (London, l$6l), 48.
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